From fed by the world to food security : Accelerating agricultural development in Africa by Breman, Henk et al.
  
 
Throughout the years Henk Breman and his colleagues have sought to combine in 
depth agricultural research with operational policy advice. As a policy maker I was 
impressed by their creativity and thorough knowledge of conditions in the field. In this 
book they bring together promising results of research and experience in a large group 
of countries. In a period of accelerated climate change, erratic rainfall, decreasing soil 
fertility and high population pressure an integrated approach to agricultural 
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 Foreword 
The current global development agenda is framed by the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). In turn, the SDG agenda, “Transforming Our 
World – the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, is built on the 
foundation that emerged from the Rio+20 Earth Summit in 2012 – "The Future 
We Want”1. The present report is a key contribution to SDG2 which aims to 
“End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture”.  
Nowhere in the World is the SDG agenda more relevant and urgent than in 
Africa. Indeed, achieving SDG2 in Africa is one of the most important 
challenges facing us today. Africa currently faces rates of population growth 
unprecedented in the history of mankind. A booming population is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, the “youth dividend” – a rapidly growing 
population in both rural and urban areas – provides a huge demand for 
nutritious food and has great potential for work. On the other hand, the rising 
population puts even more pressure on natural resources, particularly in 
densely-populated fragile areas, which already suffer from land degradation, as 
a result of continuous cropping without adequate inputs and declining farm 
sizes. 
The core issue addressed in the report is how to accelerate development in 
Africa. By analysing changes in cereal yields since the 1960s and relating these 
to both socio-economic and agro-ecological conditions, the authors arrive at a 
positive perspective. They find strong signs that agricultural development is 
taking off in many countries and suggest ways these trends can be extended 
to countries that are lagging behind. Boosting productivity through increasing 
fertilizer use as part of integrated soil fertility management, emerges as a key 
first step on the ladder to agricultural growth.  
Henk Breman, who for many years was based in Africa, has devoted his career 
to these important issues. He led the writing of this report with inspiration from 
No'am Seligman and support from Tom Schut. Their analysis is an important 
contribution to the debate on the future of Africa – and on how to achieve SDG2.  
 
 
                                                 
1 United Nations, 2015. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. 
70/1 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. United Nations 
General Assemby, Washington DC. 
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I strongly commend this report to you and encourage you to delve deeper than 
just the abstract. Read on! 
Ken E. Giller 
 
Professor of Plant Production Systems, Wageningen University  
 
Co-chair of the SDSN Thematic Network 7 on Sustainable Agriculture and Food 
Systems2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wageningen, September 2019 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 http://unsdsn.org/what-we-do/thematic-networks/sustainable-agriculture-and-food-systems/ 
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 Abstract 
 
This document presents the results of a search for policies and conditions that 
can help accelerate agricultural development in Africa. This development has 
been limited in many countries, as evinced by extreme low fertilizer use, low 
crop yields, poverty and high food insecurity. The rate of development is 
quantitatively described for the period 1961–2014 for almost fifty countries, 
those of the African mainland plus Madagascar, on the basis of data on the 
average cereal yield and fertilizer use. 
 
The way the rainfall impacts on the fertilizer-yield relationship has been studied, 
by comparing contrasting rainfall transects in Western and Southern Africa, 
occupied by respectively 19 and 9 countries. On the basis of data from the 
period 1981–2014, it is shown that soil fertility dominated over rainfall in 
determining crop yields. 
 
Data on the evolution of cereal yield rates over the entire 1961–2014 period 
have been used for dividing the 49 countries into two main groups, subdivided 
into four and two classes. In the first group of countries, the yields per hectare 
increased, in different degrees. The second group includes one class of 
countries with stagnating yields since 1961, and one that at present has lower 
yields than in 1961. Here, any increase in food production has come from area 
expansion. 
 
All countries have been categorized on the basis of socio-economic as well as 
agro-ecological conditions. The comparison of classes enables the 
identification of stimuli and obstacles for agricultural development. The role of 
policies for change has been studied as well, with a view to identifying policies 
that can help accelerate agricultural development in Africa. The dominance of 
poor soils, often combined with difficult climates, explains in part why 
agricultural development has been slow. In many places, the low average 
natural production conditions have resulted in a population density that is much 
too low to allow for a financially beneficial use of fertilizer and other external 
agricultural inputs. The high costs of transport and trade, and of food and labor, 
have seriously hindered agricultural development in many African countries. 
Market oriented production, for the national or the international market, did not 
become the driver for development, in contrast to countries with more suitable 
climates and better soils.  
 
A hopeful tendency emerges from this study: African agricultural development 
is taking off in response to population growth, as is shown by the cereal yield 
and fertilizer use adoption trends in many countries. Three quarters of the 
African population lives in countries with positive yield growth rates, with some 
of them having reached Green Revolution growth rates. Policies and conditions 
are presented that enable accelerated yield growth, which is a matter of life and 
death for the last quarter of the population, which lives in countries with no 
significant or negative yield growth rates, but is also of vital importance for 
VII
countries with low productivity growth rates. The promotion of increased 
fertilizer use combined with integrated soil fertility management in rainfed 
agriculture has been identified as a first step towards achieving national food 
security and decreasing poverty. It will provide abundant and low cost food, 
allowing for cheaper labor, requirements for more economic growth and political 
stability on the continent. To become effective, these measures should become 
part of a larger policy package aiming for a rural development in which farmers, 
business people and governments are truly partners. Agricultural and broad 
economic development can only be furthered, if all of these stakeholders are 
unified in their efforts to bring down the costs of trade and transport and to 
develop a viable agricultural input and product market. 
 
Keywords: cereal yield; fertilizer; rainfed agriculture; soil fertility; agro-ecology; 
socio-economics; agricultural policy; agriculture for development. 
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Introduction 
 
1 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Food-insecure Africa 
 
The Green Revolution of the last century has bypassed Africa. Few are the 
countries where the use of external inputs such as fertilizer1, improved seeds 
and pesticides has become common practice. At present2, the average world 
fertilizer use on cropland is about 135 kg/ha/year, while the average use by 
farmers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is barely 15 kg/ha/year. The resulting food 
insecurity and rural poverty are reasons to question the efficacy of agriculture-
related policies. 
 
While most African economies rely heavily on agriculture (Ciceri & Allanore, 
2018), food insecurity is more widespread in Africa than anywhere else in the 
world (e.g. Rakotoarisoa et al., 2011). The 2017 Global Food Security Index (The 
Economist, 2017), providing data on 113 countries, classified 80% of African 
countries3 as countries where food security “needs improvement”. The 
performance of about 14% of the countries was classified as “moderate”, and 
that of the remaining countries as “good”. Asia and Latin America were on 
average between the moderate and good performance, and in general Latin 
America was more food-secure than Asia. European, North American and 
Oceanian countries are nearly all in the “best performance” class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 “Fertilizer” means chemical fertilizer in this text; “manure” and “compost” are used for sources of 
nutrients from animal and plant origin. 
2 The “present” is 2014, the last year for which rather complete agricultural data are available for 
the world and separate countries at the World Bank and FAO. 
3 Including those for which no data are available. 
Early starvation is a 
real risk in a 
number of African 
countries, both for 
human beings and 
animals. 
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Yield stagnation in Africa and yield increases elsewhere have resulted in a 
growing divide, evinced by differences in the available kilo-calories (kcal) per 
person (Roser & Ritchie, 2017) and in the number of undernourished in relation 
to the population. Cereal import dependency is also much larger in Africa, 
resulting in large food trade bills for African countries (Rakotoarisoa et al. 2011). 
 
1.2 The Green Revolution bypassed Africa 
 
In the world as a whole, the average food production per person started to 
increase in the early sixties (Roser & Ritchie, 2017), as the so-called “Green 
Revolution” unfolded. More and more farmers in developing countries started 
adopting the use of external inputs – improved crop varieties, chemical fertilizer 
and pesticides. De Wit (1986) showed that in the rich Western world, the 
adoption of Green Revolution technology caused a sharp increase in crop yields. 
Without the external inputs, under the pressure of increasing demand, the 
average annual cereal yield increases with about 7 kg/ha. The general adoption 
of external inputs, like in North America and Europe, resulted into an average 
annual cereal yield increase of about 75 kg/ha/year. An increase in nitrogen 
fertilizer use per ha directly results in more protein output (Lassaletta et al., 
2014). In Africa, however, countries which have adopted fertilizer use are rare, 
and consequently the average annual yield increase on the continent as a whole 
       Africa has millions of displaced persons. Only a small part of them live outside the continent. 
 
 3 
has been barely 10 kg/ha/year from the 1950s to the end of the 1990s (Breman, 
1998). Latin America and Asia had annual yield increments of almost 30 
kg/ha/year; here the score remained in the intermediate range, due to large 
differences between countries in the extent to which external inputs are being 
used (De Wit, 1986; Grassini et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bad transport conditions in 
many African countries have 
hampered agricultural 
development. In a world 
with liberalized markets, 
high input prices prevent 
African agricultural products 
from being competitive. 
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1.3 Ineffective policies 
  
Agricultural development analyses show that past and present national policies 
as well as those of governmental and non-governmental development partners 
were not effective in pulling the African population out of poverty and assuring 
food security. The lack of food security is the result of both low productivity and 
of limited socio-economic development (e.g. Pieri, 1989; Breman & Debrah, 
2003; Nin-Pratt et al., 2011; Rakotoarisoa et al. 2011; Mutsaers & Kleene, 2015; 
Benin, 2016; Koning, 2017; Ciceri & Allanore, 2018). Examples of mistakes and 
problems mentioned are: a general neglect of agriculture by policy makers who 
privilege industrialization, the importation of cheap food outcompeting local 
farmers, the replacing of manure by fertilizer instead of combining them, the 
neglect of poor soils, and counterproductive policies. Other more general 
problems include corruption or, what Koning (2017) calls “rivalling ethnic-
clientelist networks”, weak institutions, poor infrastructure, unequal trade 
agreements, market failure, credit constraints, and inappropriate development 
projects. 
  
An effort to effect change, from the side of African leaders, has been the creation 
of the African Union in 2002, which has led to structured collaboration among 
African countries. Through the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Program (CAADP; https://au.int/en/caadp), the countries aim for acceleration of 
agricultural growth and transformation. Analyzing the effects of the program, 
IFPRI observes that the funding and implementation of Africa’s agricultural 
development strategy leave much to be desired, and points to large differences 
between the member states (Benin, 2016). The governmental partners in 
particular are increasingly eager to make their support more effective, spurred 
on by the fear of a growing problem of refugees and migrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
African soils are amongst 
the poorest in the world. It is 
strange, therefore, that 
governments and donors 
concentrate almost 
exclusively on investing in 
irrigated agriculture.  
The average African 
fertilizer use is only one-
tenth of the world average; 
therefore crop yields are 
very low. 
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1.4 Highly heterogeneous conditions  
  
Benin (2016) attributes the limited policy effects in Africa to the large variation in 
socio-demographic, agro-ecological, economic and market factors. He 
distinguishes 17 unique farming systems, and 543 agricultural productivity 
zones. And he suggests that the opportunities for a Green Revolution similar to 
the Asian one4 are limited; only in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Malawi such an 
approach would have a good chance of succeeding. Elsewhere, region-specific 
Green Revolution technologies will have to be developed, requiring significant 
investments in research and development, and the opening up of new output 
markets. Giller et al. (2011) and Dixon et al. (2018) have come to a similar 
conclusion: African farming systems are highly heterogeneous and single 
solutions for improving farm productivity do not exist. 
 
Besides an agro-ecological heterogeneity, in Africa we find a socio-economic 
heterogeneity, resulting from differences in history and geographical position 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Collier, 2008). Collier (2008) stresses the 
differences between countries with ports on the coast and land-locked ones, and 
distinguishes among the latter those with good and with bad neighbors. An 
example of a bad neighbor is one not offering significant market access for the 
land-locked country. 
 
                                                 
4 Having cereal yield increase through fertilizer as a key component. 
Africa is indeed a very heterogeneous continent.  
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1.5 Questionable recommendations 
 
Surveying the numerous failed policies mentioned in section 1.3, and the variety 
of agro-ecological zones and socio-economic conditions mentioned in section 
1.4, one may be tempted to conclude that no silver bullet solution exists. This 
conclusion is discouraging for African farmers and decision makers. It will take a 
lot of time to develop a multitude of solutions, tailored to the need of regions and 
specific groups of farmers. At the same time, there are pressing reasons for 
making haste: 
 The African population is growing fast; unless soil nutrient losses are 
compensated, the already poor production potential will be impaired by soil 
nutrient mining; food insecurity and rural poverty threaten to increase 
(Buresh et al., 1997; Henao & Baanante, 2006). 
 As Tittonell & Giller (2013) have shown, the large yield gaps in African 
agriculture can become poverty traps: further yield declines and soil nutrient 
mining need to be halted urgently. 
 In many countries, it becomes increasingly difficult to expand the land area 
used for agriculture (Chamberlain et al., 2014), and the land still available 
has a lower production potential than land already under exploitation (Ciceri 
& Allanore, 2018). 
 Exhausted and degraded tropical soils are difficult to restore (Morris et al., 
2007), requiring large amounts of nutrients and soil amendments to rebuild 
soil reserves. 
 
These reasons for urgent action in the meantime offer a hint for an alternative 
approach. Instead of developing a multitude of tailored solutions, national 
governments, donor countries and organizations could jointly5 focus on a step-
by-step elimination of key bottlenecks. The first thing to focus on would be soil 
fertility improvement, for the following reasons: 
 Many of the numerous African agro-ecosystems are alike in that their natural 
production potential (NPP)6 is (very) low, and generally determined to a 
higher degree by poor soils than by low rainfall (Buringh & van Heemst, 
1977; Breman, 2015), while parts of the regions with high soil fertility are 
heavily populated and have depleted soils due to insufficient fertilizer use7. 
 It is mainly because of Africa’s low production potential that the Green 
Revolution bypassed the continent (Breman & Debrah, 2003). 
 McArthur & McCord (2017) predict “strong potential yield and growth effects 
resulting from policy efforts to support adoption of a Green Revolution-type 
package of complementary inputs in economies with low agricultural 
productivity and a large share of the labor force still in agriculture”. 
                                                 
5 E.g. in the framework of CAADP 
6 Production without external inputs or irrigation. 
7 A good illustration is the Western Rift, with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Tanzania and 
Malawi. See, for example King & Yi Wang, 2017. Almost all countries with fertile soils but without 
high population pressure, are found in the zone of the tropical rainforest, where most of the land 
has not yet been converted into cropland. 
 7 
 Fertilizer use is the best means for improving poor soils and tackling the 
problem of natural low production potential (e.g. Nin-Pratt et al., 2011; 
Rakotoarisoa, M.A., et al., 2011; Benin, 2016; McArthur & McCord, 2017; 
Ciceri & Allanore, 2018). 
 Carr (2017) and Ricker-Gilbert et al (2014) observed in Malawi that the size 
of the vulnerable population is inversely correlated with the amount of 
fertilizer used per capita. 
 
1.6 Fertilizer for triggering agricultural development acceleration 
 
Thus, there is a good case to be made for using fertilizer as a means for 
triggering accelerated agricultural development in Africa. This study provides 
extra arguments supporting the decision of the African heads of state to declare 
fertilizer a strategic commodity for an African Green Revolution (African Union, 
2007). The environmental risks of using fertilizers are recognized (Alberda et al., 
1992; Breman, 2002; Nosengo 2003; Bouwman et al., 2017), but at the same 
time the warning voiced by Smaling et al. (2006) is heeded that, in the face of 
the African population density, not using fertilizer will destroy the environment by 
overexploitation of natural resources. Besides, the risks related to fertilizer use 
can be well controlled by avoiding misuse and by providing a context of 
integrated soil fertility management (ISFM8; Breman, 2002; IFDC, 2005; 
Wopereis et al., 2008; Bationo et al., 2011b; Bationo et al., 2012). 
  
Some economists maintain that Africa should focus on developing alternative 
sources of income as the basis for socio-economic development, if the natural 
resources seem too poor to sustain an economy based on agriculture. However, 
for many countries it has been impossible to industrialize without agricultural 
development as an intermediate step (Vlasblom, 2013). More importantly, 
without agricultural development, insufficient numbers of people are expected to 
find decent work and an income high enough to become food-secure (Koning, 
2017). The World Bank (2007) stressed that GDP (gross domestic product)  
growth originating in agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty 
as GDP growth originating outside agriculture. Besides, “Agriculture, including 
agribusiness, is projected to be a US$1 trillion USD industry in sub-Saharan 
Africa by 2030 (World Bank 2013)” stated van Rooyen (2014), at the start of an 
article in which he mentions that more than 5 million ha of African land is being 
leased by foreign investors. The fact that foreign and local land grabbing is rife, 
shows that land use is rewarding (Batterbury & Ndi, 2018; Jayne & Muyanga, 
2018). 
 
One may even question if the large heterogeneity of African agro-ecosystems is 
a real impediment for an African Green Revolution if soil fertility improvement is 
chosen as the main line of approach. Even in fields widely varying in terms of 
soil fertility (Kihara et al., 2016; Njoroge et al., 2017), balanced fertilizer use 
                                                 
8 Integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) combines the care of crops with soil care, using 
fertilizer to nourish the crops and soil amendments to improve and maintain soil health. 
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provides options to maintain crop yields at high levels (Njoroge et al. 2019). 
Some of the scientists who stress the need to develop a multitude of regionally 
tailored solutions (Giller et al., 2011) have developed an approach which, they 
believe, can contribute to the design of a “uniquely African green revolution” 
(Tittonell et al., 2011; Vanlauwe et al., 2014). The mapping of African soils is 
making rapid progress (e.g. Hengl et al., 2017), and the effects of fertilizer use 
on many crops have already been studied, including the use in an ISFM context. 
The proceedings of a symposium about Africa’s Green Revolution treat more 
than 200 agronomic experiments, regarding more than 50 crop species (Bationo 
et al., 2011a). Cereals receive by far the most attention (45%), followed by 
legumes (30%) and vegetables (10%). Chauvin et al. (2012), describing the 
consumption pattern in sub-Saharan Africa, found that roughly 45, 35 and 10 
percent of African plant foods were cereals, vegetables plus fruit and legumes; 
and they mention that the consumption of cereals is still increasing. That is why, 
in this study, cereal yields will be used as the main indicator for an African 
“agriculture for development” (World Bank, 2007) triggered by increased fertilizer 
use. This, of course, by no means implies that the productivity of other crops 
should not be improved as well.  
 
   Maize without and with fertilizer during a drought (respectively in the foreground and 
   background). The growing season rainfall was only 220 mm, instead of the normal 400 mm. 
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2. APPROACH 
 
2.1 Goal 
 
The objective of this study is to determine what can be done to accelerate 
agricultural development in Africa, and thereby to further food security and socio-
economic development. Increasing crop yield is proposed as the key step to be 
made, and (balanced) fertilizer use as the required means. 
 
For measuring agricultural development, cereal yield growth and fertilizer use 
are chosen as indicators. Fertilizer – the primus inter pares among external 
inputs – is critically important in Africa, where soils are generally poor. This is 
borne out by analyses showing a clear relation between yield and fertilizer doses, 
taking into account rainfall and its variability. African countries will be classified 
on the basis of the degree of yield growth, in order to identify other key agro-
ecological and socio-economic parameters differentiating the classes. These 
characteristics are then viewed in relation to bottlenecks for change and present 
policies, in order to identify conditions and policies for yield growth acceleration. 
It will be shown that significant increase of fertilizer use is a conditio sine qua 
non for improved food security and for making agriculture contribute to socio-
economic development. 
 
2.2 Countries studied 
 
Data regarding 18 Western1 African countries (Table 1) and 9 countries from 
Southern Africa (Table 2) have been employed to improve insight in the role of 
soil and climate, rainfall in particular, as sources of food insecurity and as 
bottlenecks for development (sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.3.1). The selected 18 
countries are on three dry–wet transects, two in West and one in Central Africa: 
from the Sahara desert to Liberia and Sierra Leone, countries with very high and 
very intensive rainfall; and from the Sahara to the Central African Republic (CAR) 
and Cameroon, countries with very high rainfall. The Southern African countries 
cover a transect from the dry Namibian coast to humid Malawi and Mozambique. 
 
In the other sections of chapter 3, treating linkages between yield growth rates 
on the one hand and demographic, socio-economic and policy conditions on the 
other, data from as many countries as possible have been used. However, with 
the exception of Madagascar, islands have been neglected in view of their 
peculiarities. For 49 countries in total the yield growth rate from 1961 till 2014 
has been calculated, but, because of a lack of accessible data, in most cases it 
was impossible to study the relation with all the variables mentioned above. For 
the analyses presented in chapter 3, data from a varying number of countries 
were used; in each case the countries included will be mentioned. 
 
                                                 
1 Western Africa: West Africa plus Chad, Cameroon and Central Africa. 
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2.3 Data use and sources  
 
Given the huge amount of literature about African agriculture, it is rather difficult 
to make objective choices regarding the information to be used. The difficulty is 
compounded by the poor quality of many of the data, such as national-level 
statistics, which reflects the limited capacity and weak institutions of poor 
countries (Jerven, 2013). Open-access data from renowned institutes have been 
used as much as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
The authors at work in the field. First, second and third row, respectively Henk Breman, 
Tom Schut, and No’am Seligman. 
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The evolution of the total cereal production has been studied for all mainland 
countries and Madagascar for the period 1961–2014. Where production 
increased, it was determined to which extent the increase was the result of area 
expansion and/or productivity increase. Data on fertilizer use and annual rainfall 
were added for the 27 countries mentioned at the start of section 2.2, for the 
period 1981–2014. The total fertilizer use per hectare was explored; cereals 
turned out to receive just above 60% of it (FAO, 2006). With the exception of 
rainfall data, open-access data of the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/) 
and FAO (www.fao.org/statistics) were used. Economic data, such as the gross 
domestic product (GDP), gross national income (GNI) and agricultural 
contribution to the GDP, the trade logistics index (TLI), as well as data on the 
degree of urbanization and the CO2 emission per capita, are from the World Bank 
as well. Figures relating to land use (arable land; rangeland; irrigated land) are 
FAO data, but data on the availability of arable land per country per capita are 
again from the World Bank. 
  
Rainfall data have been obtained from CHIRPS 2.0 (Funk et al., 2015). The 
average annual rainfall for agricultural zones was calculated for each country, 
excluding zones with < 300 mm/year. This isohyet has been chosen in view of 
the fact that in the Sahel, the region with the most extreme potential evaporation, 
it separates the zone where water is the most limiting factor for plant growth (< 
300 mm/year) from the zone where nutrients are more limiting (> 300 mm; 
Penning de Vries & Djitéye, 1983).  
 
Relationships between rainfall and yields were evaluated for the countries on the 
three dry–wet transects described in section 2.2, and further differentiated 
according to fertilizer use. Linear, or, when significant, segmented regression 
lines were fitted, using the standard and the segmented regression toolbox in R 
(v 3.5) and R studio (https://cran.r-project.org). A mixed linear regression model 
was used to evaluate average yield responses to annual rainfall in interaction 
with fertilizer application and region, with a year as random factor (figures 1 and 
2). The intensity and frequency of droughts per climate zone (tables 1 and 2) 
have been calculated by using 33 years of rainfall data from 27 countries.  
 
Supplementary climate data, on potential evapotranspiration and aridity, that are 
used together with average rainfall in subsection 3.3.1 and its tables 1 and 2, 
were obtained from CGIAR’s consortium for special indicators 
(https://cgiarcsi.community/data/global-aridity-and-pet-database/). 
 
Soil data were derived from ISRIC’s soil property maps for Africa (Hengl. et al 
2015;2017; http://www.isric.org/content/new-generation-soilproperty-maps-
Africa). Buringh and van Heemst (1977) have been consulted for the estimation 
of the natural production potential (NPP) per country. They estimated it for all 
continents, distinguishing four series of broad land units. Each series has its own 
natural production potential, the average yield obtained without manure, 
fertilizer, or irrigation, expressed in cereal yield. A transparent layover of Africa’s 
map with country borders allowed an estimation of the NPP per country. 
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Soil and climate data were used to characterize the agro-ecological conditions 
of countries (tables 1 and 2). They determine if special attention and/or 
investments are required to ensure that fertilizer use is effective (enough). The 
climate factors considered are rainfall and the risk of droughts and extreme 
aridity, due to very high potential evapotranspiration in relation to rainfall. The 
soil factors considered are extreme pH values (pH > 8 for certain soils in 
countries with low rainfall, or pH < 4 in countries with very high and very intensive 
rainfall), and low storage capacity for water and/or nutrients. 
 
As mentioned above, the World Bank has been the main source of data 
regarding socio-economic conditions (used in section 3.2, subsection 3.3.3, and 
in tables in the annex). However, the food security index (FSI) of countries, 
indicating food availability as well as accessibility, was obtained from The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (https://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com); and the 
human development index (HDI)2 was obtained from UNDP 
(hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi). As stated above, both 
agro-ecological and socio-economic parameters help identifying (combinations 
of) conditions which are positively or negatively linked with yield growth classes 
(subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3). There is a risk that the interaction between 
variables results in co-variation without real causality. However, the study of 
McArthur & McCord (2017) about agricultural inputs and their effects in economic 
development shows that this risk is limited. 
 
Special attention is paid to population density and the derived availability of 
arable land per capita (section 3.2), as a factor that is known to be positively 
correlated with fertilizer use adoption (Breman & Debrah, 2003; Ricker-Gilbert, 
2014; Nin-Pratt, 2016). Also the financial benefits of fertilizer use receive 
particular consideration (subsection 3.3.2), as a factor that can be influenced by 
the efficiency of farmers (e.g. Snapp et al., 2010) and policies (prices). The 
fertilizer prices were derived from AfricaFertilizer.org 
(https://africafertilizer.org/national/) and the cereal prices were derived from 
USDA World Markets and Trade reports (https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/grain-
world-markets-and-trade). For estimations of farm-gate prices we relied on 
agricultural economy experts from the different countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 “The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a 
decent standard of living. The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities 
should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth 
alone. The HDI can be used to question national policy choices.” (UNDP) 
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3. RESULTS 
 
In spite of the overall negative image of African agriculture, it is worthwhile to 
realize that crop production is increasing and that food security is improving on 
the continent. In 2014, the African population of more than 1.1 billion people is 
almost 3.9 times the population of the early sixties of the last century. In the same 
period, the cereal production increased 4.1 times. And indeed, fertilizer use per 
hectare, now at 12% of the world average, is increasing too: two decades ago it 
was only 10%. This two percent increase represents a yearly extra use of 60,000 
MT of fertilizer for the continent. Below, the increasing fertilizer use is analyzed, 
and ways to accelerate its adoption are explored. 
 
3.1 Increasing fertilizer use and yields 
 
3.1.1 Soil fertility more limiting than rainfall 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present national annual data regarding cereal yields during the 
period 1981–2014 for the 18 continental Western and the 9 continental Southern 
African countries. Figures 1a and 1b present these yields in relation to the 
average annual rainfall per country and per year, distinguishing in Figure 1a the 
two regions, and in Figure 1b very limited and moderate fertilizer use. In several 
countries the annual rainfall was below the critical 300 mm limit (Penning de 
Vries & Djitéye, 1983) in some years due to droughts.  
 
Figure 1 shows an extreme variation as far as the yield-rainfall relationship is 
concerned. Only at about 250 mm of annual rainfall yields above 1,000 kg/ha 
can be obtained, and at 500 mm/year yields of 4,000 kg/ha are possible. 
However, below 1,500 mm/year much more high yields were reported than 
above 1,500 mm/year; the average yield with high rainfall is only about 1,250 
kg/ha.  
 
 
Maize during a drought (220 mm of rain during the growing season, instead of the normal 400 
mm). a) Unfertilized poor soil. b) A high dose of fertilizer on that poor soil. c) Fertilizer use in an 
ISFM context on that poor soil. The maize developed equally well in cases b) and c), thanks to 
fertilizer use. However, in case b) the crop ran out of water and died. In case c), thanks to ISFM, 
the soil organic matter content was high enough to keep the rainwater in the root zone of the crop. 
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Figure 1  Panel A. Average national annual cereal yields in relation to average national annual 
rainfall of all continental Western African (WA) and Southern African (SA) countries for 
the period 1981–2014 with fitted regression lines for SA (dashed) and WA (solid).  
  Panel B. Average national annual cereal yields in relation to average national annual 
rainfall of continental Western and Southern African countries for the period 1981–2014 
with fitted regression lines, distinguishing absent or very low fertilizer use (dashed line) 
and moderate use (dotted line). 
 
A first explanation for the extreme variation presents itself when figures 1a and 
1b are compared: the similarity in distribution of blue and red colored points 
illustrates that moderate fertilizer use is common in Southern Africa, whereas it 
is not in Western Africa. The curves representing the average relationship 
between yield and rainfall for the two regions (Figure 1a) or the two dose groups 
(Figure 1b), make clear that the relation between yield and rainfall is rather weak 
and exists only for rainfall below about 1,250 mm/year, increasing in this range 
with 69 kg (WA) or 87 (SA) kg yield per 100 mm of rainfall. 
 
Figure 2, presenting the average national annual cereal yields in relation to the 
fertilizer doses applied, illustrates again that moderate fertilizer use is mainly 
Results
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limited to Southern Africa. Years with more than a national average of 15 kg/ha 
of fertilizer use on cropland are rare in Western Africa.  
 
In both regions, yields increase by 21–22 kg/ha with every extra kg of fertilizer 
applied. Onwards from a fertilizer dose of 100 kg/ha, the yield still increases 
proportionally with the amount of fertilizer used. When considering the average 
trends shown in figures 1 and 2 for yield-rainfall and yield-fertilizer relationships, 
it becomes clear that poor soils limit African agricultural development much more 
than limited rainfall. Average yields in high-rainfall countries are about 1,250 
kg/ha. Yields up to 4,000 kg/ha were reported at a maximum dose of only 100 
kg/ha of fertilizer, of which only a part was used on cereals (FAO, 2006). The 
part of the national fertilizer use which benefits cereals also varies; it is on 
average 60% (section 2.3). This partly explains the variation of the yields as well. 
Using enough fertilizer enables much higher yields; van Ittersum et al. (2016) 
identify large yield gaps for current rainfed cereals in Africa, up to 10,000 
kg/ha/year and higher in specific high-potential regions. 
 
Food supply is not assured by sufficiently high yields alone; the stability of these 
yields is also important. Climate does play a role here, as variability in rainfall 
affects the yields. This variability is less in Western Africa than in Southern Africa. 
In Southern Africa, the average annual rainfall increases from 300 to 1,100 mm, 
and its coefficient of variation (CV) decreases from 0.25 to 0.13, from the driest 
part of the transect (Namibia and the Western part of South Africa) to the wettest 
part (Malawi and Mozambique), indicating that rainfall not only increases but also 
becomes more reliable and less variable from year to year. On a comparable 
rainfall transect in Western Africa1 the CV decreases from 0.17 to 0.09; and when 
continuing to regions with 2,700 mm of annual rainfall, it decreases further to 
0.07. 
 
In fact, the yield effects of rainfall variability are limited as long as nutrient 
limitations are more important.  This is generally the case, except in the driest 
part of the transects where yields fail completely in the driest years, with the 
growing season becoming too short for crops to reach full maturity.  
 
The effects of rainfall variability on yields partly depend on the depth of soil 
wetting by rain. The thicker the humidified soil layer, the more nutrients are 
dissolved and can be absorbed by the crop. The effect is, however, far from 
proportional to the rainfall variability, as the soil nutrient content decreases 
rapidly with soil depth. Therefore, the effect of rainfall variability on yield 
variability increases with soil fertility and is presumably further amplified by  
                                                 
1 Many of the Sahelian countries in Western Africa went through a drought of long duration in the 
study period. Most years between 1970 and 2000 had rainfall below the 100-year average (L’Hôte 
et al., 2002); the average rainfall without this drought would have been about 100 mm/y higher than 
the observed average of the study period. 
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Figure 2  Average national annual cereal yields in relation to average national annual fertilizer 
use of all continental Western and Southern African countries for the period 1981–
2014. 
 
fertilizer use. This is a third factor explaining the extreme variation observed in 
figures 1 and 2. The two countries with negligible fertilizer use in Southern Africa, 
Namibia and Mozambique, have CV values for yields of respectively 0.27 and 
0.32. The average rainfall of the two countries is 427 and 957 mm/y and the NPP 
< 0.5 and 1.0-1.25 t/ha respectively. For the eight Western African countries with 
negligible fertilizer use, CAR, Chad, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Niger, 
Sierra Leone and Togo, falling into the NPP classes of < 0.5, 0.75-1.0, 1.0-1.25 
and 1.25-1.5 t/ha, the yield CV per class are 0.16, 0.20, 0.22 and 0.26 
respectively. On average, yield variability decreases with increasing rainfall, as 
shown above, but this effect is here disturbed by the higher natural soil fertility in 
countries with a high NPP. 
 
Thus, yield variability is also increased by fertilizer use. The yield CV for the 
Western African region is with 0.22 lower than the 0.32 for Southern Africa. The 
average fertilizer use over the entire 33 years period has been respectively 4 
and 24 kg/ha/year. South Africa, the country with the highest fertilizer use of all 
27 countries (65 kg/ha), has also the highest yield CV: 0.38! 
 
The yield CV will also vary with fertilizer use efficiency. The latter is often low 
and very variable, because of the recent fertilizer adoption in many countries. 
Besides the limited knowledge and experience of farmers, the natural poorness 
of soils and/or soil depletion explain the low initial fertilizer use efficiency. Poor 
soils require a balanced supply of a number of nutrients, while fertilizer, at least 
during introduction and early adoption, typically provides N (nitrogen) , or N with 
P (phosphorus), but seldom a balanced mixture of all required nutrients. The 
supplied nutrients will partly go to exhausted soil pools of in particular N, P and 
potassium (K), strongly delaying their availability to the crop. Further, the 
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competition between crops and soil organisms for fertilizer nutrients is 
presumably stronger on depleted soils. These factors together are causing low 
fertilizer recovery and use efficiency. In time, when soil pools are restored (Wolf 
et al 1987; Janssen et al. 1987) and the nutrient content of the soil organic matter 
is improved, the efficiency increases (Fofana et al., 2008).  
 
3.1.2 The evolution of fertilizer use and cereal yield 
 
Both of our agricultural development indicators, fertilizer use and cereal yield, 
increase over the period 1981–2014. Fertilizer use increased only slightly, from 
an average of 3 to 6 kg/ha and from 25 to 29 kg/ha from the first 5 years (1981-
1985) to the last 5 years (2010-2014) in Western Africa and Southern Africa 
respectively. The cereal yields, over the same period, increased from 900 to 
1,350 kg/ha in Western Africa and from 980 to 1,410 kg/ha in Southern Africa. 
 
Fertlizer use and cereal yield not only increased; the increase accelerated. The 
difference between the average of the first 5 years and the overall 33 years 
average for each region was significantly lower than the difference between the 
overall average and the average of the last 5 years. During the latter period, 
many countries seemed to have transitioned from agriculture based on internal 
inputs to more intensive production, using external inputs. 
 
In Figure 3, the cereal yield increases in the USA, Asia and Africa, as presented 
by De Wit (1986), are combined with yield data from Western and Southern 
Africa. For Asia, the data up to 1980 from the Wit (1986) have been combined 
with World Bank data from 1980 onwards. Around 1950, when in the United 
States external inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds and pesticides started 
to be generally adopted, the average annual yield increase of cereals went from 
3 to 50 kg/ha. Better control over production factors doubled this average annual 
growth rate after 1980 to 100 kg/ha/year. Local adoption of Green Revolution 
technology in Asia resulted in a growth rate of 25 kg/ha/year from 1955 to 1980, 
while the growth rates in Africa at 10 kg/ha remained very close to the growth 
rate that can be achieved without external inputs. Only South Africa and Egypt 
adopted external inputs at a significant scale. 
 
In Asia the use of external inputs became more general in the early 1980s, and 
a cereal yield growth rate of 60 kg/ha/year was reached. In Western and 
Southern Africa, the average growth rate doubled from 10 to 20 kg/ha/year in the 
second half of the 1990s. These growth rates are still far below their potential; in 
numerous countries fertilizer use has remained insignificant.  
 
Positive exceptions in Western Africa are Ghana, Ivory Coast and Mali. During 
the second half of the 33-year period, they reached yield growth rates above 30 
kg/ha/year. In the last decade, rates above 40 kg/ha/year have been reported. 
Their fertilizer use during the last five years was with 15 kg/ha/year three times 
the average of the entire period. Mauritania also shows a relatively rapid and 
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increasing growth rate, but recent data on the use of fertilizers are not available. 
Other countries showed negative to slightly positive yield growth rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  The evolution of African cereal yields compared to those of Asia and the USA. Curves 
from the USA, Asia and Africa as a whole: De Wit (1986)2. 
 
In Southern Africa more variation was observed. South African farmers adopted 
the Green Revolution with external inputs and technologies long ago. The cereal 
yields are increasing with almost 80 kg/ha/year over the entire period, while 
fertilizer use is decreasing: input use is becoming more efficient! During the 
second half of the 33-year period, Zambia and Malawi reached an average 
growth rate of 50 kg/ha/year, as high as Asian countries between 1960 and 1980 
(Figure 3). Their average fertilizer use during the last 5 years reached 35 
kg/ha/year. Zimbabwe’s yield growth rate, which stood at 35 kg/ha/year in the 
1980s, collapsed due to the socio-economic crisis. Fertilizer use became 
negligible and average yields at the end of the period were more than 500 kg/ha 
less than at the start, which prompted a rapid conversion of forest into cropland 
(Chagumaira et al., 2015). 
 
Exceptional is the situation in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini3, where 
significant amounts of fertilizer were used without clear yield increments (see 
section 4.1). Yields varied strongly and showed a boost, in Lesotho and Eswatini, 
during the second half of the 1990s. But the average yield in 2013 was almost 
100 kg/ha lower than in 1981. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Recent research show that, indeed, yield growth is often linear. However, the strong yield 
increases shown in Figure 3 for the United States and Asia, as well as those in Europe and other 
countries where high doses of external inputs are used, are reaching plateaus, or even start turning 
into yield decreases (Grassini et al., 2013). 
3 Formerly called Swaziland. 
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3.1.3 Growth rate of yields per country 
 
Countries were divided in two groups with six subclasses, on the basis of the 
overall yield growth rate tendencies that were observed in spite of (large) annual 
yield fluctuations (Figure 4). Group A, covering classes 1, 2, 3 and 4, shows an 
effective yield growth over the entire period or over the last 15 years, with growth 
rates becoming more limited going from class 1 to 4. Group B shows for class 5 
a stagnating cereal yield growth rate, and for class 6 a yield decrease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Countries classified in six classes based on the average annual yield change over the 
entire 1961–2014 period and the last 15 years. 
 
Class 1 countries have an average annual growth rate of cereal yields of at least 
70 kg/ha for the entire period, or at least for the last 15 years; Green Revolution 
technologies appear to have been adopted. Class 2 countries show an 
increasing rate of growth for cereal yields, at a rate which averages 40 to 70 
kg/ha/year for the last 15 year. For class 3 countries, the average growth rate is 
slower, but reaches values of between 20 and 40 kg/ha/year during the entire 
period, or over the last 15 years,. Class 4 countries also show a tendency 
towards yield increases, but the the average growth rate has been slightly more 
than 10 kg/ha/year only for the last 15 years. 
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Countries in class 5 have stagnating yields or a slight tendency towards yield 
growth for certain periods (Eswatini and Togo), but these growth rates are too 
low to expect more than negligible use of Green Revolution tools, while fertilizer 
use does not significantly increase. The tendency for class 6 countries is one of 
yield decrease since 1961, in spite of the fact that the countries may have known 
(much) higher yields, as Zimbabwe has. 
 
The class 5 countries dominate the map of Africa as far as the total area is 
concerned, but class 3 countries are the most numerous (Figure 4). Yield growth 
characteristics of SSA as a whole are also those of class 3. However, more 
important than the area or number of countries is the population that has to be 
nourished. The population of countries with decreasing yields represent 3% of 
the total of 1,135 million people living at the end of the observation period in the 
countries shown in Figure 4. The populations of the class 5 countries comprise 
23% of the total African population. In other words, about one quarter of Africans 
live in countries with stagnating or decreasing cereal yields, and three quarters 
live in countries with accelerating yield growth or in countries where agriculture 
has already reached Green Revolution growth rates. 
 
3.2 Yield growth, population density and fertilizer use 
 
Population density was identified as an important driver for the adoption of 
fertilizer use, and thereby for yield increase (section 2.3). The annual yield 
growth per country was plotted against the availability of arable land per capita 
(Figure 5). This figure illustrates more quantitatively than Figure 3 the 
acceleration of yield growth that took place in group A countries in contrast to 
group B countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 5  Average annual yield growth per country in relation to the availability of arable land per 
capita for 1961-2014 (panel A) and 2000-2014 (Panel B), differentiating between 
countries in yield growth classes 1–4 (group A) and 5–6 (group B). 
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In spite of the strong decrease of arable land per capita (cap.) for the 19 countries 
in classes 5 and 6, the yield growth observations for the last 15 years (Fig. 5b) 
are at the same level as those for the entire period (Fig. 5a), or around zero 
growth. For the 27 countries in classes 1–4, with decreasing arable land per 
capita, a clear tendency of yield growth exists, becoming even more marked 
during the last 15 years of the time series. In other words, yield increments rates 
accelerated for these countries. 
  
Egypt is an exceptional country in class 1, with a zero growth rate over the last 
15 years and an average availability of arable land during that period of only 0.05 
ha/cap. It has an average yield growth over the entire period of 79 kg/ha/year. 
During the last 15 years, yields remained constant at a high level of 7,200 
kg/ha/year; the yield potential has been reached (Grassini et al., 2013). 
 
The point of gravity of the class 1–4 countries moved from the average yield 
growth rate for the entire period of 25 kg/ha/year at 0.35 ha/cap. of arable land, 
to an average yield growth rate of 41 kg/ha/year at 0.22 ha/cap. over the last 15 
years. For class 5 and 6 countries these values are 2 kg/ha/year at 0.54 ha/cap. 
and 2 kg/ha/year at 0.29 ha/cap. respectively. To indicate what these yield 
growth rates mean for improving African food security, we use FAO’s standard 
of 250 kg/cap./year of cereals for covering the human energy requirement, and 
a population growth rate of 2.5%. The average yield growth rate of 41 kg/ha/year 
for the class 1–4 countries during the 2000–2014 period implies an annual 
increase of the cereal availability per capita of 41 x 0.22 or 9.0 kg. 
 
The population growth requires an annual increase of 250 x 0.025 or 6.2 kg. In 
other words, if all arable land is used for producing cereals and all cereals are 
available for feeding the African population, the yield growth is more than 
keeping up so far with population growth, at least as far as energy requirements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A positive correlation exists for African countries 
between their population density and their 
agricultural development. The average number of 
births per woman for African countries varies from 
6.5 in the poorest countries to 2.5 in the richest. By 
using agriculture for socio-economic development 
the population growth can be reduced. 
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are concerned. In Africa as a whole, the average yield growth rate is 30 
kg/ha/year at an availability of arable land of 0.24 ha/cap. This implies an annual 
increase of the cereal availability per capita of 7.2 kg, more than the 6.2 kg/cap. 
required by population growth.  
 
However, this calculation presupposes a distribution of the production of surplus 
countries among the people in countries with insufficient yield growth rates. 
Without this transfer from surplus countries, the cereal availability per capita is 
falling in class 4 countries by 2 kg/year, and in class 5 and 6 countries by more 
than 6 kg/year. 
 
It is crucial to realize that the two groups differ not only in yield growth rates but 
also in fertilizer use. The average of fertilizer use for the class 1–4 countries over 
the last period is 43 kg/ha/year, and for the class 5 and 6 counrties 13 kg/ha/year. 
 
3.3 Yield growth and other variables 
 
One technological factor, fertilizer use, and one social factor, population density, 
have been invoked to help understand the large yield growth rate differences 
among African countries (Figure 4). The scattering of cereal yield and cereal 
yield growth values in figures 2 and 5 show that these two factors explain only 
part of the differences. The three following subsections evaluate selected agro-
ecological and socio-economic factors that help identifying combinations of 
parameters which are linked with the yield growth classes.  
 
3.3.1 Yield growth and agro-ecological conditions 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present for countries on the Western and Southern Africa 
transects for the period 1981-2014 their yield growth class, their NPP group, and 
a rough indication of the risk that crop growth will be hindered by climate and soil 
conditions. The rainfall column indicates the risk of droughts hampering crop 
growth: single or double minus signs behind the rainfall number indicate high 
and extremely high risk. A minus sign in parentheses indicates that the risk of 
drought exists in spite of high rainfall, due to the fact that the rain is divided over 
two rainy seasons. If aridity, extreme soil pH or limited storage capacity for water 
and nutrients is considered to be a potential bottleneck for a country, this is 
indicated by an x sign. 
 
The fact that countries with high or increasing yield growth rates (class 1–4) and 
with stagnating or decreasing yields (respectively class 5 and 6) can be found in 
all NPP groups, each with their own climate and soil characteristics (tables 1 and 
2), suggests that socio-economic factors are more important as constraints for 
agricultural development than agro-ecological factors.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 do not show, however, that in course of 33 years, the frequency 
of dry years as well as their severity decreased in both regions. As indicated in 
section 3.1, yield growth rates started to increase in the second half of the period 
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in particular. Not all countries have equal opportunities for realizing a (strong) 
yield increase. When developing their agriculture, the West African Sahelian 
countries have to take drought risks (in the whole of the country or parts of it) 
into account. The problem is the most serious for Niger, where low rainfall, high 
aridity and low water storage capacity (due to the prevalence of sandy soils) 
come together. Even outside the Sahel, droughts are a real risk in certain regions 
of six countries (Table 1). Therefore, fertilisation may not always produce the 
expected benefits. In the two Sahelian countries with the lowest rainfall 
(Mauritania and Niger), the high soil pH can pose a problem. In the two countries 
combining extremely high and intensive rainfall with strongly weathered soils 
(Liberia and Sierra Leone), the low soil pH is the inhibiting factor. In areas with 
aluminum toxicity, the last problem is even greater. 
 
Table 1  Western African countries characterized by their yield growth rate class, their national 
production potential (NPP), and related potential key climate and soil bottlenecks* to 
be overcome for strong yield increase. 
 
Country Climate Soil bottlenecks Yield growth 
rate 
class 
Rainfall 
mm/year** 
 
Extremely 
high aridity 
Exceptional pH 
values 
Very limited storage 
capacity 
for water for nutrients 
NPP < 0.5 t/ha/year 
Mauritania 302 -- x x  x 2 
Niger 329 -- x x x x 5 
Chad 613 - x x  x 4 
Mali 665 - x  x x 3 
Burkina 
Faso 
717 - x    3 
0.5–0.75 
Benin 1,113 (-)   x  3 
Nigeria 1,278   x  4 
0.75 – 1.00 
Senegal 573 -   x  3 
Gambia 803     6 
Togo 1,162 (-)     5 
Ghana 1,165 (-)   x  3 
Liberia 2,240  x   4 
Sierra 
Leone 
2,687  x   3 
1.00 – 1.25 
Guinea 
Bissau 
1,226   x  3 
Ivory 
Coast 
1,278 (-)   x  2 
Guinea 1,815     6 
1.25 – 1.50 
CAR 1,464     5 
Cameroon 1,619     3 
*  Indicated by x if not related directly to rainfall. 
** - and -- behind the rainfall number indicate high and extremely high drought risk;                                     
(-) indicates drought risk in spite of rather high rainfall, distributed over two growing seasons. 
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Table 2  As Table 1, for Southern African countries. 
  
Country Climate Soil bottlenecks* Yield 
growth 
rate class 
Rainfall 
mm/year 
Extremely 
high 
aridity 
Very limited storage 
capacity 
for water for nutrients 
NPP < 0.5 t/ha/year 
Botswana 418 -- x x x 4 
Namibia 427 -- x x x 5 
0.75–1.00 
South Africa 534 -  x  1 
1.00–1.25 
Zimbabwe 602    6 
Lesotho 738  x  6 
Eswatini 757    5 
Mozambique 957 (-)    5 
1.25–1.50 
Zambia 997    1 
Malawi 1,100    2 
 
* The pH column, present in Table 1, is lacking. None of the countries has agricultural soils 
with extreme pH values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The population density in regions with fertile volcanic soils is much higher than in regions 
with poor sandy soils. Fertilizers are more effective on fertile soils. Applying fertilizer in an 
ISFM context is indispensable for significant sustainable effects on poor soils. 
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Agro-ecological conditions in themselves are not the main obstacle for adopting 
fertilizer and other inputs, including improved seeds and pesticides; yield growth 
rate classes are rather arbitrarily distributed over agro-ecological zones (see 
tables 1 and 2). South Africa, a class 1 country that has reached high levels of 
productivity, has a low average rainfall and a below-average natural production 
potential. In spite of soils with a low organic matter content and a related low 
storage capacity for nutrients and water, all Sahelian countries, except Niger, 
show increasing yield growth, in different degrees (classes 2–4). Even in Niger, 
a class 5 country, with only 330 mm average annual rainfall in the period 1981-
2013 and a NPP below 0.5 t/ha (Table 1), using fertilizer can lead to 700% millet 
yield increase: 2.9 instead of 0.4 t/ha (Fofana et al., 2008). 
 
The fact that agro-ecological conditions do not preclude effective fertilizer use 
and its adoption, does not mean that they do not constitute bottlenecks. Extreme 
soil pH values and low soil organic content can be overcome. The same counts 
for drought risks. But these agronomic solutions come with additional costs. 
Nevertheless, fertilizer use appears economically feasible in drought-prone 
countries with difficult soils, including South Africa (class 1), Mauritania (class 2), 
Mali and Senegal (class 3), and Botswana (class 4). The average annual doses 
used per class by the end of the period of observations is presented in Figure 
6B. Data by country can be found in tables III and IV in the annex. 
 
3.3.2 Yield growth and input and output prices 
 
Policy no doubt prevails over agro-ecological factors in determining agricultural 
development (subsection 3.3.1). It is, however, difficult to distinguish between 
loose initiatives and implemented and enforced policies in many countries, 
especially as the measures pertain to a wide range of domains. A shortcut would 
be to evaluate policies affecting prices (section 2.3; Morris et al., 2007). The 
results of an evaluation of several other policy factors are presented in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
 
For less than half of the 49 countries farm-gate prices for certain fertilizers and 
cereals were obtained; data were lacking for all countries in class 6 (yield 
decrease). For the highest number of countries, prices were obtained for maize 
and rice, the cheapest and the most expensive cereals. In the case of fertilizers 
it concerned urea and NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium). The results 
obtained show only a limited correlation between the price levels of fertilizers 
and cereals and the yield growth rate classes; the fertilizer-cereal price ratio does 
not improve going from class 4 to 1. But taking all four classes with a positive 
growth rate together (classes 1–4), average prices for urea and NPK were 
respectively 0.63 and 0.70 US$/kg around 20144, while fertilizer was on average 
more expensive in class 5 countries: respectively 0.82 and 0.88 US$/kg5.  
                                                 
4 Data from respectively 15 and 10 countries. 
5 Data from 6 countries. 
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In fact, these prices are only of interest in relation to the prices obtained by 
farmers for their crops. Therefore, the price of one kg of N has been derived from 
the urea prices, and has been divided by the price of 1 kg of cereal. An 
experienced farmer on good soils is able to produce about 25 kg of rainfed maize 
per kg of N, or 30 kg of irrigated rice (paddy). For the countries of the yield growth 
rate classes 1–4, the average price of fertilizer-N around 2014 proved to be 5,5 
times more expensive than the price obtained for maize, and 3.2 times than the 
price for paddy (US$/kg : US$/kg). In class 5 countries fertilizer-N was 
respectively 7.1 and 5.8 times more expensive6. Fertilizer and crop prices play a 
role, but other factors will be at least as important. 
 
3.3.3 Yield growth rate and other socio-economic factors 
 
While no clear relationships were found between degrees of agricultural 
development and agro-ecological conditions (subsection 3.3.1), those with 
socio-economic conditions are numerous. The role of arable land per capita and 
of input and output prices were already considered above. Tables I and II in the 
annex show, for all 49 countries, nine other socio-economic factors as well as 
the yield growth class. Table I presents countries in yield growth rate classes 1–
4, Table II those in classes 5 and 6. The values are those from the last 5 to 10 
years of the observation period (1961–2014) . The human development index 
(HDI) has been used to differentiate countries; HDI is an index combining health, 
education and income criteria. The high number of data and their strong variation 
make it difficult to read these tables. Therefore, the general trends are presented 
in Figures 6A–6D, while in the tables for each of the socio-economic factors the 
values for individual countries have been presented. Numbers are given in bold 
italic if they are on the part of a scale considered as being really unfavorable for 
agricultural development and food security. High values are not always good: 
thus, a high agricultural added value (percentage of the GDP) and fragile state 
ranking are clearly unfavorable. 
 
A factor left out in Tables 1 and 2, because it is so hard to express it in 
quantitative terms, is the stability of societies. It is hardly a surprise that, as Table 
II in the annex shows, twelve out of the nineteen countries without agricultural 
development have been notoriously unstable countries. In general, the stability 
of the 27 countries in Table I (annex) has been better, at least recently. Maps of 
Dietz and de Vink (2017), showing the African “no-go areas” and the relative 
fragility of African states, make clear that a correlation exists between stability 
and agricultural development expressed by the yield growth classes. It is shown 
in Figure 6A. Going from yield growth rate class 1 to 6, the average fragility of 
countries increases, while the corruption perception index is decreasing, which 
means that corruption increases.7  
 
In each of the four panels of Figure 6, two symbols for class 5 countries are 
shown, one in black and one in red. Some of the countries without (significant) 
                                                 
6 Data of 12 countries from classes 1–4, and 6 from class 5.  
7 The corruption perception index is going from 100, “very clean”, to 1, “highly corrupt”.  
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agricultural development did not really fit into the group and were displayed as a 
separate group. Although these countries shared a lack of annual yield 
increments, their resemblance in other respects was (very) limited. The countries 
of class 5a do neither show significant agricultural development nor socio-
economic development in general. Importing food seems to be preferred above 
production in the country. In contrast, the socio-economic characteristics of the 
countries in class 5b resemble those of class 1 countries, or are even better. 
These class 5b countries focus on socio-economic development through mining 
and investing in industrialization while neglecting agriculture. So, although the 
value added by agriculture is low, they have a (relatively) high FSI, and their CO2 
emission per capita is among the highest in Africa. Most8 did not score badly in 
the fragile state ranking and corruption perception index. Figure 6A shows as 
average fragile state ranking respectively 98 and 77 for 5a and 5b. The 77 
ranking is even more favorable than the average of 85 for the class 1 countries. 
Also, there is less corruption in class 5b than in class 1 countries, while in 5a 
countries the corruption is very high. By the way, one class 4 country was also 
reclassified as class 5b, Botswana (see Table I, in the annex, for the list of all 
other class 5b countries); this strongly improved the homogeneity of class 4. 
 
 
Choices like these are never entirely objective. We hesitated in the cases of the 
Kingdom of Eswatini and Lesotho, countries in some respects similar to the class 
5b countries: rather stable countries, having a limited contribution of agriculture 
                                                 
8 Libya is an exception. The end of the observation period coincides with the fall of Qaddafi.  
With just above 40 percent of people living in towns, Africa is the continent with the 
lowest degree of urbanization. 
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to the GDP but no extremely low FSI (Table I, annex). But their CO2 emissions, 
being low, do not suggest important investments in industrialization. They stayed 
among the 5a countries. The 5a and 5b countries number 11 and 5; the number 
of countries in the classes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are 5, 5, 12, 4 and 4 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6  Socio-economic characterization of countries by yield growth rate class at the end of 
the observation period. 
 
A. Fragile state ranking (FSR, 1–113; from the lowest to the highest fragility) and 
corruption perception index (CPI, 100–1; very clean to highly corrupt). 
B. Annual fertilizer use (kg/ha of arable land), food security index (FSI; 1–100), and 
the agricultural added value (AAV, percentage of the GDP). 
C. Gross national income (GNI/cap. x 103 US$/year) and trade logistics index  
(TLI; 1–5). 
D. Annual emission of CO2 (x 10
3 t/cap.) and degree of urbanization (percentage of 
the population living in urban environments). 
 
Figure 6B combines information about agriculture (contribution to the GDP), its 
development (fertilizer use), and food security (FSI). As general trends, going 
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from class 1 to 6, fertilizer use decreases rapidly and the agricultural added value 
increases strongly. Class 5b countries, however, use as much fertilizer as class 
3 countries, but their average agricultural added value is with 4% only a quarter 
of the average of class 1 countries. Also, the class 6 countries don’t follow the 
general trend as far as the contribution of agriculture to the GDP is concerned; 
the relative importance of the agricultural added value is almost equal to that of 
class 1 countries. The class 1 to 3 plus the 5b countries, almost all using fertilizer, 
have a relatively high FSI; the class 4, 5a and 6 countries, most of which are not 
using fertilizer, are very food-insecure.  
 
Within the 4 classes with a relatively high FSI and significant fertilizer use (class 
1 to 3 and 5b), three out of the twenty-seven countries do not use fertilizer: 
Congo, a class 5b country, which is importing food, and Madagascar (class 1), 
and Uganda (class 3), known for the promotion of organic farming. Madagascar 
in particular does not fit in its class; it is very food-insecure. (In subsection 3.4.7 
below, more will be said about organic farming.) 
 
Among the food-insecure class 5a and 6 countries, several use some fertilizer: 
Kenya, Eswatini (class 5a), Lesotho and Zimbabwe (class 6). Both agricultural 
development and general socio-economic development seem stagnating. In the 
class 6 countries, lower cereal yields were observed at the end of the observation 
period (2010–2014) than at the start (1961–1965). Except for Lesotho, it 
concerns instable countries (see annex, Table II) which have known better days 
in terms of agricultural and socio-economic development. This explains why their 
average agricultural added value is rather low and similar to those of class 1 
countries, as indicated above. 
 
Figure 6B helps to understand the well-established inverse correlation between 
food security and agricultural economic relevance, the contribution of agriculture 
to the GPD. The correlation is clearly shown in Table 3, which presents 
information on all 47 African countries from tables I and II (annex): food security  
in Africa increases with income, but decreases with the share of agricultural 
added value as percentage of the GDP. The more farmers the less food! 
Upwards from an agricultural added value of about 30%, the average FSI9 does 
not decrease much further; it remains about 30%. We are dealing here with 
typical “agriculture-based countries” as defined10 by the World Bank (2007), 
where an “agriculture for development agenda” is badly needed. The ratio of 
consumers to farmers has to increase strongly, which means that a lot of 
employment outside agriculture needs to be created. 
 
All countries with an FSI clearly above the average trend of increasing FSI with 
decreasing GDP share of the agricultural added value are countries with 
developing agriculture, although the degrees of development differ (Table I, 
                                                 
9 Taking both food availability and accessibility into account (see section 2.3). 
10 Agriculture accounts for a large share of GDP (32% on average), and most of the poor live in 
rural areas. More than 80% of the rural sub-Saharan population lives in coutries with an agriculture-
based economy. 
Results
C
ha
pt
er
 3
Chapter 3 
 
30 
annex). Most countries with an FSI clearly below the average are countries not 
showing agricultural development (Table II, annex). However, three countries 
with agricultural growth from Table I (annex) are having an FSI below the 
average trend. It concerns Chad, a country heavily relying on agriculture (53% 
GDP) and showing just the beginning of agricultural development (class 4; Table 
I, annex), and Angola and Zambia, countries in which the agricultural added 
value contributes only 6 and 7% to the GDP (Table I, annex). Angola, in yield 
growth rate class 3, imports huge amounts of food. Zambia, in class 1 (!), exports 
more than it imports (Rakotoarisoa et al., 2011). A significant part of Zambia’s 
population is too poor to buy enough food; this accounts for serious food 
insecurity in spite of a relatively high GNI/cap. (Table I, annex). Zambia is among 
the African countries with a high inequality index (Roser & Ortiz-Ospina, 2018). 
 
In 15 of the 47 countries studied, the food import bills are lower than the 
agricultural export revenues (Rakotoarisoa et al., 2011). Of these, besides 
Zambia, seven countries regularly experience serious food insecurity (expressed 
in a FSI below 35). Only three of them, Eritrea, Gambia and Zimbabwe, do not 
show agricultural development, as indicated by their respective yield growth 
rates classes 5, 6 and 6. The other countries are in class 4 (Chad), 3 (Burkina 
Faso and Guinea Bissau), 2 (Malawi) and 1 (Zambia). (See tables I and II in the 
annex).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not urbanization as such, but rather 
industrialization that stimulates agricultural 
development. 
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Table 3.  The food security index of African countries per group of countries following the 
World Bank’s classification of economies and the agricultural added value as 
percentage of the GDP per group. 
 
WB classification GNI 
x 1000 US$/cap 
FSI Agricultural 
added value (% GDP) 
n* 
High income 39.3 78 1 1 
Upper middle income 7.5 59 5 8 
Lower middle income 2.1 42 14 17 
Low income 0.7 30 33 24 
 
* n = number of countries 
 
Figure 6C presents the annual gross national income per capita and the trade 
logistic index for each of the yield growth rate classes. Figure 6D gives the 
annual CO2 emission per capita and the degree of urbanization. Going from class 
1 to 6, the GNI/cap., the TLI, and the CO2 emission decrease. No clear 
correlation is found, however, with urbanization. But the average degree of 
urbanization for the classes 1 to 3 plus 5b is with 49% significantly higher than 
the average of 35% for classes 4, 5a and 6.  
 
The average HDI values of the classes are not presented in Figure 6. The 
GNI/cap. is a key element of the index and inherently, the pattern of decrease 
going from class 1 to 6 is very similar to the decrease of the GNI/cap. In general, 
FSI is positively correlated to both HDI and GNI/cap. However, when comparing 
countries with and countries without agricultural development (respectively Table 
I and Table II in the annex), it appears that countries with a similar HDI strongly 
differ in food security, evidenced by lower FSI values for Table II countries within 
the same HDI category as those of Table I countries. This agricultural 
development appears more strongly related to industrialization than to 
urbanization: the log-converted CO2 emission (CO2/capita in tables I and II; 
Jullien et al., 2017) explained 58%, while the degree of urbanization explained 
only 29% of FSI variation. It is the urban population that should buy food 
produced by the rural population, enabling the latter to invest in agricultural 
development. However, urbanization without industrialization cannot do the job. 
  
Both the degree of urbanization and the carbon emission per capita decrease 
with larger agricultural added value as percentage of the GDP. At agricultural 
added values above 20% of the GDP, almost negligible values of carbon 
emissions are observed, with limited variation. The degree of urbanization, 
however, is extremely variable. At agricultural added values below 10% of the 
GDP, values between 20 and 90 percent are observed, while at agricultural 
added values of 40% of the GDP, urbanization still varies between 10 and 50 
percent. The extreme cases of high urbanization without significant carbon 
emission, read industrialization, are Somalia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia and Mauritanian, and to a lesser degree Togo, Mali, DR Congo, and Ivory 
Coast. Presumably, their cities are concentrations of poverty, and offer few 
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opportunities for labor outside agriculture. Cheap food imports and food aid 
attracts people to these centers rather than paid jobs. Insufficient urban income, 
due to limited industrialization, precludes the formation of functioning markets for 
agricultural products needed to trigger agricultural development. Class 5b 
countries combine a high degree of urbanization and relatively high CO2 
emission (Figure 6D), but seem to prefer importing food to developing their 
agriculture. 
  
The TLI, covering the quality of transport (including the needed infrastructure) as 
well as the administrative burden, shows a clear proportionality with the yield 
growth rate (Figure 6C). This index appears at least as effective as a policy 
indicator as prices, treated in subsection 3.3.2, supporting the Breman & Debrah 
(2003) arguments to explain why the Green Revolution bypassed Africa. Their 
main argument was that the high costs of external inputs and the limited 
competitiveness of agriculture on the regional and global market were caused 
by low road density and a limited and low-quality transport and transport 
infrastructure. One should note that the TLI is the only factor presented in Figure 
6 which shows very similar values for class 5a and 5b countries. The explanation 
is presumably the very low road density related to a population density of                
6 cap./km2 around 2014, and the high degree of urbanization in class 5b 
countries (Figure 6D).  
 
3.4 Taking into account bottlenecks for change and present policies 
 
Rakotoarisoa et al. (2011) showed that Africa has become a net food importer, 
and that the continent has a larger undernourished part of the population than 
any other. As stressed by Giller et al. (2011), a consensus exists on the need to 
increase agricultural productivity to eradicate hunger and poverty, an thus to 
reach the first Sustainable Development Goal. As shown above and in literature 
(e.g. Nin-Pratt et al., 2011; Bationo et al., 2011.a, Rakotoarisoa, et al., 2011; 
Lassaletta et al., 2014; McArthur & McCord, 2017; Ciceri & Allanore, 2018) 
fertilizer use goes hand in hand with yield increase of cereals and other crops, 
also in Africa. The African Heads of State declared that fertilizer is a strategic 
good, similar to medicines (African Union, 2007). In one of the background 
papers for their conference, the Africa Fertilizer Summit (African Region World 
Bank, 2006), past but failed efforts to promote fertilizer use in Africa have been 
analyzed. The lessons learned and good practices guidelines developed are still 
very useful. Nevertheless, African fertilizer use per hectare is still only about one-
tenth of the average world dosage, while Africa has an extremely low average 
NPP, largely due to poor soils (see chapters 1 and 2). In order to identify 
opportunities for accelerating agricultural development, the findings presented in 
the preceding sections will here be viewd in relation to bottlenecks for change 
and present policies. 
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3.4.1 Low natural production potential 
 
Agro-ecological bottlenecks can be overcome, but the costs for increasing the 
agricultural productivity may be rather high (subsection 3.3.1). In Africa, Green 
Revolution technology may be less cost-effective than in more favorable world 
regions. As stressed in the introduction, the average African NPP is among the 
lowest in the world; only Australia has a somewhat lower NPP11. It is important 
to realize, however, that traditional low-external-input agriculture is even less 
efficient; the logistical costs per kg of product on the market are much higher. In 
Rwanda in 2006, it turned out to be more interesting for milling houses to import 
Argentinian wheat than to buy local wheat. Going for yield increase using 
external inputs is worthwhile; the cost per kg of produce decreases significantly 
(Habimana, 2008). 
 
It is recommended to apply fertilizer in a context of integrated soil fertility 
management (ISFM), combining soil care with crop care (Breman & Sissoko, 
1998; Vanlauwe et al., 2010; Vanlauwe et al., 2015), to make fertilizer as use-
efficient and effective as possible. When practiced well, ISFM has many benefits, 
such as ensuring improvement and maintenance of the soil organic matter 
status, providing greater buffers against mismanagement, preventing soil 
acidification, and improving the nutrient and water storage capacity of the soil. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 According to Buringh & van Heemst (1977), Australia has an average NPP of 520 kg/ha/year, 
Africa 630 kg/ha/year. 
Also harsh environments allow for agricultural development. Livestock thrives where    
wildlife thrives 
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Serious mistakes made in the early days of fertilizer introduction in Africa were 
imbalanced applications, and the replacement of manure by fertilizer instead of 
developing optimal combinations (Pieri, 1989). The above-mentioned millet yield 
obtained thanks to fertilizer use in Niger, that was 7 times higher than the 
average national yield (Fofana et al., 2008), was realized during an on-farm 
demonstration of fertilizer use in an ISFM context. The highest yield of 2.9 t/ha 
was obtained in a year with only 370 mm of rainfall. With improved soil organic 
matter content, rainwater is better captured, and both water and fertilizer 
nutrients are well stored in the top soil, making fertilizer use very effective. In a 
similar on-farm test in the northeast of Rwanda, the combined use of fertilizer 
and ISFM led to a maize yield of 2.2 t/ha in an extremely dry season with only 
220 mm of rain, which caused complete yield failure without the approach 
(Breman, 2011). 
 
This use of fertilizer in an ISFM context should also become a practice in regions 
threatened by lower rainfall due to climate change. It stabilizes harvests and 
leads to a high water-use efficiency (WUE), here measured as kg of cereal grain 
per ha per 100 mm of extra rainfall. In Western Africa, the average WUE of all 
year-country combinations without or with minimal fertilizer use (Figure 1a) is the 
highest in the northern Sahel region (225 kg per ha of  
Even in the lowest natural-production-potential class, some countries have a well-developing 
agriculture.  
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cereal grain per 100 mm), and decreases going south, becoming only about 75 
kg/ha/100 mm in the forest zone. Crops use rainwater less efficiently in Southern 
Africa. The WUE is 60 kg/ha/100 mm lower in the driest zone and the difference 
is still 20 kg/ha/100 mm in the humid savanna. 
 
Low WUE is caused by very poor soils, or the low availability of nutrients. The 
WUE decrease from the dry to the wet ends of the transects is explained by the 
relative availability for crops of nutrients and water; it decreases with increasing 
rainfall. Without fertilizer use, most water is lost by evaporation, run-off and 
leaching. Using fertilizer on soils containing enough organic matter can triple to 
quintuple the WUE (Penning de Vries & Djiteye, 1982). This is illustrated by the 
highest yields in Figure 1; more than 4,000 kg/ha were obtained at about 500 
mm of rain, with a WUE of about 800 kg/ha for 100 mm of extra rain. Penning de 
Vries & Djitéye (1982) have shown that a high WUE is easier to obtain on heavy 
soils than on light sandy soils, as sandy soils with a coarse soil texture and 
typically low soil organic matter content have a low water-holding capacity. 
Therefore, ISFM is even more important on sandy soils than on loam and clay. 
ISFM is not simply the combination of fertilizer and manure or compost: good 
manure or compost with low C:N ratios12 degrades easily on sandy soils in Niger 
(IFDC, 2005; Wopereis et al., 2008). As Suzuki et al. (2016) observed, “This 
suggested that crop residue with typically high C:N ratio’s) has more potential 
than cattle manure to enhance the effect of fertilizer.” 13 
 
3.4.2 Land tenure  
 
Introducing ISFM on poor or exhausted soils implies two phases: soil 
improvement, and annual maintenance of the improvement. The soil 
improvement investments are on average about 750 US$/ha (Breman et al., 
2003). They will not be easily made as long as land tenure is not well secured. 
Land registration in Africa is still at low levels; only about 10 percent of the rural 
land is formally recorded in a public register, leaving 90 percent held under 
customary law (Byamugisha, 2016).  
 
Whereas in the past customary law has been a satisfactory basis for practicing 
agriculture, the combined presence of traditional laws and a “modern” land 
registry makes access to land more unequal. Well-informed and powerful actors 
enlarge their properties at the expense of smallholder farmers (e.g. for Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Niger, Bonfiglioli, 1985; for African's Great Lakes Region, Pèlerin, 
E. et al.; in general, Kasimbazi, 2017). Improving land-use security is 
increasingly urgent in view of the high African population growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 C:N ratio = the carbon content of the soil divided by the nitrogen content. 
13 The crop residue referred to is millet straw. 
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3.4.3 The benefits of increasing population density 
 
At present, the average African population pressure, expressed in the area of 
arable land per capita, is about a quarter of a hectare. This it already less than 
in Southeast Asia at the start of the Green Revolution, where the availability of 
arable land per capita was still more than half a hectare. Now, in Africa, like then 
in Asia, farmers are more and more focusing on productivity increase by adopting 
fertilizer use (section 3.2). The OECD-FAO (2016) expects that for maize and 
other coarse grains, land productivity increase will contribute 2.5 times as much 
as area increase to the total production in the coming decade in sub-Saharan 
Africa; for wheat and rice it is 1.1 times. 
 
The class 1 and 2 countries, showing the strongest cereal yield increase, have 
an average availability of arable land of 0.17 ha/cap. The average of all other 
countries is 0.27 ha/cap., and is similar for the countries with yield increase (class 
3 and 4) and those without it (class 5 and 6). In some of the class 5 and 6 
countries, the availability of arable land has fallen far below one quarter of a 
hectare (Figure 5). These countries include Burundi, DR Congo, Congo, Eritrea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Somalia and Eswatini. Except for Congo, Kenya and 
Lesotho, these countries are extremely food-insecure (annex, tables I and II). 
Policies for triggering agricultural productivity increase are badly needed here.  
 
Such policies may have played a role in Burkina Faso and Mali, countries which 
show already a relatively high rate of yield growth (class 3), while their availability 
of arable land is still at least twice as high as the average for class 1 and 2 
countries. Only six other countries have similar or higher areas of available 
arable land (0.4–1.0 ha/cap.): Chad, CAR, Namibia, Niger, Sudan, and Togo. 
Chad showed only in recent times a slight yield growth rate (class 4), the other 
countries have stagnating yields (class 5). Except Namibia, all are extremely 
food-insecure. Chad, Namibia, Niger and Sudan are also among the countries 
with the lowest NPP (< 0.5 t/ha). Bringing more land under cultivation will be 
difficult; land not yet in use will be worse in NPP than the already cultivated land. 
Also here, it seems necessary to introduce policies aimed at increasing land 
and/or labor productivity. 
 
3.4.4 Gender- related differences  
 
The UNDP’s gender inequality index country ranking 
 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII) was compared with the average national 
maize yields of each country (FAO). Maize yields turned out to increase 
exponentially with increasing gender equality. While the 10 countries with the 
highest inequality have an average maize yield of 0.75 t/ha, the 10 countries with 
the lowest have an average yield of 7.5 t/ha. Most African countries score high 
on the inequality index: 30 out of the 36 African countries rank above 100 on a 
list with 160 countries. The average ranking of the 36 African countries is 131, 
with an average maize yield of 1.3 t/ha. (This is also the average cereal yield 
derived from the data of section 3.1.). Gender inequality is an impediment for 
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change; agricultural development is difficult to achieve when those doing a lot of 
agricultural-related work are not involved in decision-making (see KIT et al., 
2013, referring to cases from all over the world). At the end of the nineteenth 
century, the government of the Nethelands, wondering why its agricultural 
development lagged behind the development elsewhere in Europe, organized a 
study which identified as a key reason the lack of emancipation and education 
of rural women. Following the approach of other European countries, the 
education of rural women of all classes was seriously taken in hand in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. This step contributed significantly to the 
development of Dutch agriculture (Van der Burg, 1988).  
 
3.4.5 Investment in rainfed agriculture or in irrigation 
 
Modern rainfed agriculture is more or less limited below a ratio of in-season 
rainfall to evaporation of 0.26 (Nidumolu et al., 2012) at around 220 mm in-
season rainfall. Mauritania, a country with an agricultural zone receiving only 302 
mm rainfall per year in the period 1981–2013 (section 2.3), and with soils 
combining exceptional pH values with very limited nutrient storage capacity, 
nevertheless belongs to yield growth rate class 2 (Table 1). It is one of the rare 
examples where investments in irrigation have played a significant role. Only 
about 5% of the country has an average rainfall of more than 300 mm/year; about 
450,000 ha. is considered being arable land, and the average cereal yield without 
Gender inequality goes hand in hand with low crop yields. 
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irrigation is 0.3 t/ha. At present 10% of the arable land is irrigated and has an 
average yield approaching 4 t/ha. While in a year with average rainfall almost 
half of the cereal production is from irrigated land, during droughts it can become 
70%, like in 2002-2003 (FAO, 2003). Mauritania’s agricultural investments focus 
on irrigation. 
 
The best-known example of a country with mainly irrigated crop production is 
Egypt, a class 1 country having 70% of its land under irrigation and using 700 
kg/ha/year of fertilizer over the last decade. Sudan has the second largest 
irrigated area, 1.5 million hectares. It is nevertheless a class 5 country. Fertilizer 
use, mainly for growing cotton, wheat and vegetables, is at a low 4,6 kg/ha. Most 
of the fertilizer is applied to irrigated crops, which are receiving up to 65 kg/ha. 
While the rainfed sorghum and millet yield average 0.7 and 0.3 t/ha, irrigated 
wheat reaches 2–2.5 t/ha. The third country is Madagascar, with more than 40% 
of its cultivated land irrigated, or 1 million hectares (FAO, Irrigation in Africa in 
figures: AQUASTAT Survey – 2005; Fethi Lebdi, 2016). Madagascar is a class 
1 country, even though it is using even less fertilizer than Sudan (see subsection 
3.4.7 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enormous amounts of money are 
being invested in irrigation. 
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Except in the countries mentioned, and in Maghreb countries (with 3–4% of 
cropland under irrigation), irrigation does not play a significant role in Africa. As 
stressed by Penning de Vries and Djitèye (1982, introduction) and Breman 
(2015), a low availability of soil nutrients is limiting crop growth much more than 
low rainfall. Irrigation by itself does not increase yields more than to levels of 1.5 
to 2 t/ha where soil fertility is the limiting factor. The additional water affects the 
yield by mobilizing more soil nutrients through deeper soil wetting, not by direct 
crop water demand (Penning de Vries and Djitèye, 1982). Irrigation should be  
accompanied by high fertilizer use, as in Egypt. Egypt’s food security is high by 
African standards. Sudan and Madagascar, with millions of hectares of irrigated 
land, but without significant amounts of fertilizer being used, are among the 
countries with the lowest food security (section 3.3.3).  
 
It is useful to take note of the fact that the opportunities for irrigation are rather 
limited in Africa. At most about 40 million hectares could be irrigated, against 280 
million hectares that can be used for rainfed agriculture. In many regions, 
profitable irrigation is seriously hindered by river water availability, and a limited 
water storage potential (water for at least two seasons is required for profitable 
irrigation). Here, again, there is a contrast with Southeast Asia, with its extreme 
monsoon rainfall. 
 
Nevertheless, large irrigation investments have been made by African countries, 
by their national and international donors, and by banks such as the African 
Development Bank and the World Bank. The message that investments in soil 
improvement are more urgent and more effective does not seem to get through. 
One does not realize that investments in ISFM are about 750 US$/ha at most14, 
against 4,000–8,000 US$/ha for small-scale irrigation, not to speak of the huge 
investments required for building dams enabling the use of irrigated land for at 
least two seasons (Breman et al., 2003).  
 
In African rainfed agriculture, crop yield gaps are typically large; close to 80% for 
water-limited potential yields (Van Ittersum et al., 2016; yieldgap.org). Yields of 
rainfed agriculture can increase three to five times by using fertilizer in an ISFM 
context. Without irrigation, cereal yields of 5–7 t/ha can be reached on farms in 
most regions (e.g. Njoroge et al. 2017), with irrigation plus fertilizer; the maximum 
yield is about 10 t/ha per season (Breman et al., 2003). 
 
3.4.6 Soil and water conservation  
 
The 300 mm isohyet is used in this study as the lower limit for using fertilizer as 
a means for increasing land productivity (section 2.3). But water can become a 
factor more limiting than nutrients where soils are too shallow to absorb and store 
the rain water, or where run-off causes significant rainwater losses. The latter is 
a risk that increases with decreasing soil cover and/or increasing slope 
inclination, in particular on heavier soils (Penning de Vries & Djitèye, 1982). Soil 
                                                 
14 Only when restoration is needed. 
Results
C
ha
pt
er
 3
Chapter 3 
 
40 
and water conservation, with ISFM, should be seen as essential components of 
all forms of agriculture. Certain governments of mountainous countries have 
decided to invest in terracing (e.g. Rwanda). This requires investments still 
(much) higher than those required by irrigation, in particular when radical 
backward sloping terraces are constructed. 
 
Externally accessible positive cost-benefit analyses of the Rwandan investments 
are in fact ex-ante studies valorizing, besides estimated land-productivity 
improvement, the supposed on-site and off-site social and environmental 
benefits (e.g. Maradan, 2017). Preliminary studies limiting themselves to the 
economics of terracing, are more critical. Iiyama et al. (2012) found that “initial 
investment costs, provision costs of inputs for yearly crop production, especially 
opportunity costs of family labour and land” tended to make this form of 
sustainable land management only marginally profitable or even not viable. Also, 
Bizoza & de Graaff (2012) conclude on the basis of the calculation of market 
prices that terraces are hardly profitable, but they insist that the opportunity costs 
of labor and manure play a key role. 
 
In so-called “intensive agroforestry”, trees are used for enhancing the effectiveness of fertilizer 
while controlling its risks. It is an important ISFM technology on mountain slopes, preventing 
wind and water erosion by increasing soil organic matter content and good soil cover. 
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It cannot be stressed enough that the relevance of physical structures for soil 
and water conservations increases when and where ISFM is neglected. 
Improving the soil organic matter status helps to decrease water run-off and to 
increase water infiltration and storage. This is why Fleskens (2007) concludes 
for Rwanda that the standard priority order should become: agro-forestry > 
progressive terraces using grass strips and/or contour bunds > radical terraces 
– unless cost-benefit analyses prove otherwise. The investment costs of 
agroforestry are less than one tenth of those of radical terraces. Breman (2018) 
shows the potential of agroforestry as an ISFM technology; it helps to control the 
risk of fertilizer use on slopes. Roose & Ndayizigiye (1997) had tested it already 
in practice, and concluded that with agroforestry and liming, together with mineral 
fertilizer complementation, the erosion hazard was controlled and the 
productivity of soil and labor was more than three times higher. 
 
3.4.7 Organic farming 
 
Among the 28 countries having (a certain degree of) agricultural development 
(Table I in the annex), two show contrasting characteristics: a clear yield increase 
and negligible fertilizer use. Madagascar, a class 1 country, is even at the end of 
the observation period (2014) using only 3 kg/ha of fertilizer. For Uganda (class 
3) it is 2 kg/ha. Both countries are well known for their promotion of organic 
agriculture. 
 
In Madagascar, a “system of rice intensification” (SRI) has been developed – an 
organic production system, focusing on healthy soils and using wide plant 
spacing and special water management. The technology has not led to food 
security; Madagascar’s FSI (28) is among the lowest of African countries (annex, 
Table I). In fact, in spite of strong support and intensive promotion, the 
technology proves disappointing (e.g. Moser and Barrett, 2003; 
Razafimanantsoa, 2008; Takeshi et al., 2009; see Berkhout et al., 2015 for a 
meta study). SRI rice covers less than 0.25% of the million hectares of rice in the 
country (Randriana, 2008). Many reasons are offered; insufficient labor in the 
face of the very high demand is the one most often mentioned. According to 
Takeshi et al. (2009), the great demand for organic resources is a key reason for 
farmers who adopt SRI to use it only on a small plot. The basic limitation of 
organic agriculture is shown by the fact that it has caused desertification in many 
parts of the world, before inorganic fertilizer eliminated the bottleneck (Breman 
et al., 2007). In Madagascar, with only 0.15 ha/cap. of arable land, land 
degradation and soil erosion are serious threats. 
 
Uganda’s situation, with 0.18 ha/cap., is not much different. The country is 
nevertheless the largest producer of organic foodstuffs in Africa. Hauser and 
Lindtner (2017) explain it by pointing to a post-war sense of urgency for the 
rehabilitation of livelihoods provoked by the degraded environment, food 
insecurity and economic instability. Local pioneers and NGOs played a crucial 
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role. It could be that up to 2% of cropland in Uganda is under organic farming15. 
Akoyi (2017) shows that it is not an advantage for coffee farmers; coffee farmers 
under the “Fairtrade-organic” scheme have a lower income than conventional 
producers. The prices are higher, but the yield is lower. 
 
 
In spite of the (very limited) area of land under organic farming, Madagascar and 
Uganda have an overall positive yield growth rate. In particular the class 1 
position of Madagascar needs an explanation. A key factor is presumably the 
high investment in improvement and extension of the irrigation system, 
concerning together annually about 50,000 ha, with improved seeds as a second 
factor16. Even without fertilizer use, the two other Green Revolution inputs, 
improved seeds and pesticides, can have a significant yield effect. This became 
apparent to the first author during his work in Burundi, DR Congo and Rwanda 
(2006-2011). The World Bank (2007) uses the past rapid agricultural growth in 
India17, which was largely the result of the distribution of high-yielding varieties, 
                                                 
15 FAO speaks about 122,000 ha or 1% of the cropland; more recent (but promotional) internet 
information is more optimistic.  
16 Website of the Malagasy Ministry of Agriculture (http://www.mpae.gov.mg/). 
17 Since the seventies, Indian cereal production increased proportionally with increasing fertilizer 
use, keeping pace with population growth (Prasad, 2009). 
 “Organic-plus-fertilizer”: combining the use of organic soil amendments and inorganic fertilizer 
leads to high, sustainable yields. 
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as an example illustrating the point that a GDP growth originating in agriculture 
is much more effective in reducing poverty than a GDP growth originating outside 
agriculture.  
 
Liu et al. (2015), studying 143 countries, present data on the low use of 
insecticides, herbicides, fungicides and bactericides in Madagascar. They insist 
that, in view of the strong correlations between cereal yields and pesticide use, 
“most countries in Africa… in particularly African countries with low per capita 
food supplies, need to continue to increase their use of chemicals in order for 
crop production to feed their increasing populations.” In contrast, many other 
countries in other parts of the world “need to decrease their use of chemical 
additions in order to protect the environment and human health”. The study does 
not have data about Uganda. Sheahan et al. (2017) do, presenting data on 
human health and pesticide use in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
They show that pesticide use is associated with statistically significant increases 
in the value of the harvest on a given plot. In Uganda, plots with pesticides have 
harvest values 38-52 US$/ha higher than plots without pesticides. A similar 
“cross-country consistency in statistical significance and magnitude” does not 
exist for organic fertilizer use, nor for irrigation. 
 
In spite of the fact that the contribution of organic farming to the total national 
agricultural production is very small, the organic mindset in Madagascar and 
Uganda, reinforced by NGOs and other donors, seems to have a negative impact 
on fertilizer use. This is risky, given the very low availability of arable land, and 
unrealistic expectations about yields under organic farming in view of the low 
availability and quality of organic sources for producing manure or compost 
(Breman et al., 2007; Breman, 2013). Floret et al. (1993) show that without 
fertilizer use land has to lay fallow for 3–4 years for every year of cultivation to 
ensure that the soil organic matter content of the soil does not decrease. Rufino 
et al. (2011) analyze the competition for organic resources in Zimbabwe and 
show the consequences for the soil organic matter status, crop yields and animal 
production. Per hectare of arable land, 4–10 ha of grazing land for livestock is 
required to produce the manure needed for maintaining crop production. They 
see increasing fertilizer use as a promising strategy to boost crop and cattle 
productivity. Giller et al. (2009) and Vanlauwe et al. (2013) show that 
“conservation agriculture”, one of the farming production systems promoted in 
Africa, is only effective when fertilizer is used. 
 
3.4.8 Crop and/or livestock farming 
 
Current policies encourage the sedentarization of pastoralists, showing a lack of 
understanding on the part of decision makers (Grandval, 2012). This lack of 
understanding leads to the disregarding of technological options for productivity 
increase and fodder quality improvement on drylands. These options require 
fertilizer use. Even in semi-arid regions poor soils limit production (much) more 
than low rainfall does (see subsection 3.1.1 and sections 4.1 and 4.3). However, 
the possibility of droughts increases the financial risk involved in fertilizer use.  In 
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the drier parts of Southern Africa, rainfall variability is even higher than at the 
southern edge of the Sahara (subsection 3.1.1). The drought-related risk 
associated with fertilizer use may be an argument for investing in irrigation (as in 
Egypt and Mauritania). Another approach, apart from irrigation, can help 
decrease the financial risk of using fertilizer in rather dry or even semi-arid 
regions: mixed farming. Fertilizer use in such regions is less risky for farmers 
integrating crops and livestock than for those focusing on one of the two (Alberda 
et al., 1992), especially where grain or other crops are tactically grazed, e.g. in 
case of droughts (http://www.grainandgraze3.com.au/).  
 
 
Mixed farming is an interesting option for two reasons. One is that both crop and 
livestock production are seriously limited on poor soils. The limited fodder poor 
soils produce is of low quality, therefore the milk and meat production are low as 
well (Ketelaars, 1991). The other is that in arid regions, where rainfall is so low 
that, even on very poor soils, it becomes more limiting than soil nutrients, the 
fodder quality is high.This makes arid regions interesting for livestock production, 
but the amount of fodder is so limited that the density of animals has to be kept 
(very) low. Pastoralists in the Sahel and elsewhere in dry Africa adapted to this 
reality by developing (semi)nomadic systems. They fattened animals at the 
desert borders during the rainy season, and tried to keep dry-season weight 
losses at a minumum by moving them to flood plains or to the savannah. Levels 
of protein production per km2 obtained by these “mobile” livestock systems are 
not only much higher than those of sedentary livestock raising in Africa, but also 
up to ten times higher than those obtained by “ranching” systems in comparable 
regions of the United States and Australia (Breman & de Wit, 1982).  
 
The system became very sensitive to droughts when the dry-season grazing land 
became increasingly occupied by crop farmers. Consequently, during droughts 
the pastoralists are obliged to sell their animals for next to nothing to crop farmers 
in the more humid regions. As long as fertilizer use is negligible, these crop 
farmers need livestock themselves for transporting nutrients from wastelands to 
their fields (Breman et al., 2007). It is interesting to note that with an equal 
average agricultural capital stock of 600 US$/cap., livestock in the class 5 and 6 
Semi-nomadic livestock serves both pastoralists 
and crop farmers. Milk can be exchanged against 
manure. 
 
Sedentary livestock is contributing to 
the food quality. Milk and cheese are 
being produced by sedentary livestock 
keepers in the neighborhood of cities. 
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countries, without significant fertilizer use, contributes 71% to that stock, against 
59% in the fertilizer-using class 1–4 countries.  
 
In the introductory phase, the benefits of fertilizer use can generally be reaped 
much easier in the form of food and cash-crops, than in the form of fodder and 
livestock. Here mixed farming systems offer an advantage; fertilizer used on 
crops ensures the availability of higher-quality by-products benefiting the 
livestock, and a start can be made with mechanizing practices through animal 
traction (for Sahelian countries, see Breman and Sissoko, 1998; for Central 
Africa, see Breman et al., 2012). Using fertilizer in mixed farming systems in 
semi-arid zones decreases the sensitivity to droughts. It does so in two ways, by 
making the system less sensitive to price fluctuations, and by allowing the use 
of manure for ISFM. Creating business links between semi-nomadic livestock 
raisers and crop growers offers the same benefits. From an economic point of 
view, this is much more interesting than forcing pastoralists to settle. It conserves 
a production system allowing the exploitation of desert borders (Breman, 2012).  
 
3.4.9 Mechanization 
 
High labor costs are a consequence of the low average African NPP (ACET, 
2017). They may account for the fact that African governments choose to 
encourage mechanization in order to trigger agricultural transformation. Diao et 
al. (2016) have evaluated such policies and spoken about “…a past littered with 
poorly-planned programs that failed to assess demand, relative neglect by 
researchers and policymakers [of the mechanization needs of farmers], and 
misconceptions about what mechanization is and is not”. Failing to develop spare 
parts supply chains and repair services, was one of the mistakes. 
 
Agricultural development can be accelerated by improving the productivity of 
land, as is argued in this publication; increasing labor productivity can in principle 
contribute to development as well (Pardey et al., 1994). Diao et al. (2016) insist 
that, in order to be successful, approaches aiming to increase labor productivity 
should vary “both across and within countries, depending on population density, 
market access, agro-ecology and other factors”. This point is well illustrated by 
Breman & Akonkwa (2012), who compare different regions in Burundi, East DR 
Congo and Rwanda. Like Diao et al., they consider the distribution of tractors to 
be an inappropriate government intervention. Mechanization is not the same 
thing as tractors operating on large commercial farms. In general, tractors don’t 
develop African agriculture; rather, agricultural development creates 
opportunities for tractors. Tractors may improve labor productivity; they do not 
by themselves increase the productivity of the land; and their extremely high 
costs make them inaccessible for all but a few farmers.  
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Indeed, the mechanization of land preparation, harvesting and threshing can be 
useful in areas with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, for female-headed 
households, where manual work is too expensive, or where the so-called 
“window for seeding and planting” is very narrow (Baudron et al., 2015; Baudron 
et al., 2019). Baudron et al. indicated “that farm power in East and Southern 
African countries is declining due to the collapse of most tractor hire schemes, 
the decline in number of draught animals and the growing shortage of human 
labour” and insist that “a consequence of low levels of farm mechanization is 
high labour drudgery, which makes farming unattractive to the youth and 
disproportionally affects women”. Sustainable intensification in Africa will require 
an improvement in access to farm power, but as Breman & Akonkwa (2012) and 
Baudron et al. (2015) observed, tractors are often too expensive. According to 
them, increased access to farm power should be “achieved through the use of 
small, multipurpose and inexpensive power sources such as two-wheel tractors, 
coupled with the promotion of energy saving technologies”. Breman & Akonkwa 
(2012) show that the use of two-wheel tractors is only financially viable in 
Burundi, East DR Congo and Rwanda for irrigated high-yielding rice. A cheaper 
alternative is the use of animal traction. Havard (1999) studied it in 11 
francophone African countries. It appears that the introduction has been effective 
where people were used to working with animals, or in countries where 
pastoralism is or has been known. 
 
 
 
 
 
An early and a modern form of 
mechanization. 
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3.5 Food availability and food security 
 
The relation between yield growth rates, food availability, and food security is 
visualized in Figure 7. It shows the average cereal yields per yield growth rate 
class at the end of the observation period. Besides yields observed in 2014, the 
differences with the 2000 yields are presented, to provide an impression of 
change. The yields are presented per capita for the rural and the entire 
population. This gives a rough indication of the food security and of the possibility 
to make a living out of farming for each of the yield growth rate classes. The 
basic data for the individual countries can be found in Table III (classes 1–4) and 
Table IV (classes 5 & 6) in the annex. 
 
3.5.1 Food availability per person  
 
Figure 7 presents the “cereal yield equivalency”, that is, the annual yield per 
capita if all arable land were covered by cereals and produced the average 
national cereal yield (kg/ha). It goes without saying that it offers a rough 
approximation of reality. Cereals occupy somewhat less than half of the arable 
land. When, for example, roots or tubers are produced, the yield is higher, but 
with the same nutrient inputs the quality and the price per kilo are lower than for 
cereals. In contrast, when beans or pulses are produced, the yields are less, but 
the quality and prices are higher. Also for cash crops the yields will be lower, but 
the value of the production per hectare will be higher. This makes the use of 
cereal equivalents a reasonable approximation of reality. Less reasonable is the 
supposition that the national production is equally distributed over all members 
of the population. 
 
Figure 7 shows clear trends; the yields per person decrease from class 1 to class 
6, while class 5b does not divert much from class 5a, as was the case with of 
one out of the nine factors in Figure 6, the trade logistics index. The yield per 
person for the rural population has been derived from the number for the entire 
population, by dividing the latter by the fraction of the population being rural18. 
The figure shows that the food availability is considerably higher in countries 
which are developing their agriculture (classes 1–4) than in countries which are 
not (classes 5a, 5b and 6). It is equally clear that the higher the yield growth rate, 
connected to the degree of adoption of the Green Revolution tools, the higher 
the food availability. 
 
The difference between the yields in 2014 and 2000 cannot be derived from the 
yield growth rates. It is the resultant of yield growth, area expansion and 
population growth during the last 15 years. The yield differences decreased 
consistently from class 1 to 6, and are negative for the classes 5 and 6. The 
highest yield losses are found with the class 5b countries, a clear indication of 
their neglect of agriculture. 
 
                                                 
18 Derived from the degree of urbanization (Figure 6D). 
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Figure 7.  Annual yield in cereal equivalents per capita for the rural (Rural) and entire 
population (All) in 2014, with the increase for the entire population since 2000 
(Inc.), per yield growth class. 
 
3.5.2 Food security  
 
The FAO norm for satisfactory food intake equals 250 kg/cap./year of cereal 
equivalents. If one keeps this in mind, Figure 7 gives a good impression of the 
degree of the average food security in the countries per yield growth rate class. 
Countries of class 1 produce on average more than twice the amount required, 
class 3 countries produce 1.4 times the minimum requirement and class 2 and 4 
countries produce just enough for their populations. The countries in classes 5a, 
5b and 6 produce respectively about 15, 40 and 25 percent less than required. 
 
In subsection 3.1.3, is was estimated that 75% of the African population is living 
in countries with (at least some degree of) agricultural development, that is, 
countries with a positive yield growth rate (classes 1–4). The classes 5 and 6, 
without significant agricultural development, are home to 25% of the Africans. 
The average annual food availability for the first group is 360 kg 
cereals/cap./year, which is 50 kg/cap./year more than in the year 2000. For the 
second group, the classes 5 and 6, the average 2014 availability is 195 kg/cap., 
40 kg/cap./year less than in 2000. For Africa as a whole, the availability in 2014 
is 320 kg/cap./year, about 30 kg/cap./year more than in 2000. This “theoretical” 
availability is almost 30% higher than the minimum requirement, and is 10% 
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higher than the 2000 level. The average annual food availability seems growing 
faster than the population; meanwhile, a quarter of the African population lives 
in countries where the food availability is insufficient and decreasing. 
 
By calculating the total annual production per person in rural areas, it is possible 
to estimate the financial benefits of farming. The average production of the 
countries of classes 1–4 can be compared with that of classes 5 and 6. Using 
the data of Figure 7, the respective levels of production are 700 and 420 kg per 
rural capita. To give an impression of what this means for farmers income, these 
levels of production have been combined with: 
 the input and output farm-gate prices of Table 5 below, with Rwanda as an 
example of a class 2 country and Burundi and DR Congo of class 5 
countries;  
 data from Habimana (2008) regarding other costs of production involved in 
“intensive farming” (class 1–4) and in “extensive farming” (class 5 and 6); 
 data on the average African family size, being five persons. 
 
On average, a smallholder family of five engaged in intensive farming produces 
annually 5 x 700 kg = 3,500 kg of cereal equivalents, whereas a family engaged 
in extensive farming produces 2,100 kg per year. If we subtract their own food 
requirements of 5 x 250 kg = 1,.250 kg, respectively 2,250 and 850 kg/family 
remain for sale. The estimated production costs per kg in intensive farming are 
considerably lower than in intensive farming; respectively 44 and 74% of the 
gross income (Habiamana, 2008). The estimated annual net income from 
farming of the two types of families was estimated at 425 and 75 US$ 
respectively.  
 
The extremely low income of class 5 and 6 farmers is due to the small farm size, 
combined with very low productivity and high production costs. About 85% of the 
latter concern the costs of land and labor, expressed in Habimana’s calculations 
as opportunity costs. Smallholder families are often not in the position to cover 
these costs; annually they spend about 260 US$ instead of their official 75 US$ 
net income. Members of the family work for others when possible, while on their 
own farm labor is constraining production during part of the season. Ongoing use 
of unproductive land with poor or depleted fertility, resulting in decreasing yields, 
often obliges farmers finally to sell their land (Tittonell et al., 2013). 
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Only when food security 
is realized, significant 
spending on housing, 
health, clothes  becomes 
possible. 
 
Discussion
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4. DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Limited accuracy 
 
The data used may be of poor quality, due to the limited capacity and weak 
institutions of poor countries (Jerven 2013), even when using data of renowned 
institutions. Unreliable data may partly account for the scattering of values in the 
described relations among factors. However, we consider these relations as 
such to be logical; the outlying values appear to be exceptions which prove the 
rule. A particular case is the redistribution of imported and subsidized fertilizer 
by smuggling, mentioned in May 2019 for Ghana1. Smuggling could explain the 
exceptional situation in Botswana, Lesotho and Eswatini mentioned in 
subsection 3.1.2, where significant amounts of fertilizer were “used” without clear 
yield increments. 
 
 
4.2 Agricultural development to increase food security 
 
Technically, it is not a problem to increase African food production and to make 
Africa food self-sufficient. Fertilizer use is part of the solution (sections 3.1–3.3; 
e.g. Quifiones et al., 1997). But to make it work, and provide food security, 
agricultural development has to drive socio-economic development, instead of 
the other way around, as posited by proponents of other approaches (World 
Bank, 2007). Here, we strongly argue that agricultural development is necessary 
not only for increasing food production, but also for increasing access to food 
and food security. “Agriculture for development” will at least be a must for 
countries with a large agricultural component in their GDP. The World Bank 
report stresses the need to recognize key policy dilemmas, and to keep lessons 
from the past in mind while taking stock of new opportunities. When both rapid 
production increase and socio-economic development will be realized in Africa, 
it is well possible that the food requirement – resulting from population growth 
and demand increase with GDP growth – estimated by van Ittersum et al. (2016) 
for 2050, will not be reached. When income increases, the population growth will 
slow down, as happened elsewhere in the world. Koning (2017) insists that the 
rich and strong countries of the world will have to assist in making this agriculture 
for socio-economic development possible. It is because of their (partly 
subsidized) competition on a global liberalized market that agricultural product 
prices are low, which makes it difficult for poor countries to develop their own 
agricultural sectors, adopt the use of external inputs for highly productive 
agriculture and consequently reduce the costs of labor. 
 
Zambia is an example of a relatively rich country where agricultural development 
is lagging behind socio-economic development; it suffers from food insecurity 
despite the adoption of fertilizer use and increasing yield trends. For many 
                                                 
1 https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Help-government-stamp-out-fertilizer-
smuggling-Akufo-Addo-to-farmers-745610# 
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people the available food is not accessible, due to Zambia’s high income 
inequality (subsection 3.3.3).  
 
The unequal distribution of wealth can become very severe where corruption is 
rife, and even worse where groups benefit financially by maintaining civil wars. 
The Sentry, a Washington think-tank, reports about the cases of South Sudan, 
DR Congo, CAR, and Somalia (https://thesentry.org/). Rich natural resources 
can become the most serious threat for agricultural and socio-economic 
development, as in the DR Congo, which belongs to the worst countries in terms 
of FSI, GNI/cap., CO2/cap., and trade logistics (annex, Table I).  
 
As expected, corruption appears to be related to food insecurity 
(https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results). The unstable class 5a and 6 
countries show more corruption and lower food security than the class 1–4 plus 
5b countries (Figure 6A). In both groups, corruption decreases as the HDI 
increases. It is easier to share wealth than poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmer organizations are important links between farmers and the market. 
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4.3 Agricultural development is taking off 
 
During the last 10 to 20 years, agricultural development starts accelerating, as 
shown by increasing fertilizer use and cereal yield growth rates (section 3.2), and 
by their effects on food production and food security (section 3.5). The World 
Bank (2007) situates the start of growth in sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-nineties 
of the last century. This acceleration is apparent in countries where three 
quarters of the African population is living (subsection 3.1.3). Akinyoade et al. 
(2014) concluded that African food production is already growing faster than the 
population, while the food quality improves as well. This, however, is not yet the 
case in a number of countries where one quarter of the African population is 
living. In these countries the food production per person is decreasing, and 
smallholder farmers are even not making a living out of their farms (section 3.5). 
The growth of urban markets is often mentioned as the engine for agricultural 
development (e.g. Dietz et al., 2012). Figure 6D shows that the relation between 
food production increase and urbanization is not very strong. There is a stronger 
correlation between food production increase and the CO2 emission per person, 
a measure of the degree of industrialization. 
 
 
4.4 The way forward? 
 
The present study aims to indicate conditions and policies that are needed to 
start agricultural development in class 5–6 countries and to accelerate 
development in class 2–4 countries. Several authors (e.g. Giller et al., 2011; 
Benin, 2016) stress that in view of the large number of different agro-
After individual farmers started with it, it took only five years before intensive crop production was 
generally adopted. One of the early adopters convinced his farmers’ organization to construct a 
panorama platform. At present, it is being used by the authorities to show visiting ministers 
intensive production up to the horizon. 
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ecosystems, agriculture development requires many local, specific solutions; 
according to them, this (partially) explains why Africa lags behind in the adoption 
of the Green Revolution technologies. This argument is in line with the reasoning 
of Diamond (1999), who tries to explain why peoples from Europe and Asia have 
played a dominant role in world history: Eurasia is distinguished by large, rather 
homogeneous ecosystems, running parallel to the Equator, and does not present 
many serious obstacles for human movement. Useful inventions easily spread 
over extended regions and enabled rapid socio-economic development. The 
Americas and Africa, with mountains and deserts perpendicular to the Equator 
as barriers, did not have this advantage. 
 
One may wonder to what extent the large diversity of agro-ecosystems is still a 
serious bottleneck in the digital era. The simple fact that agricultural development 
in the Americas is far ahead of Africa’s, while they show the same diversity of 
agro-ecosystems (van Warta et al., 2013), should raise doubts. One could also 
point to the present means of communication and information, and the growing 
stock of knowledge about obstacles and opportunities for an African Green 
Revolution (Bationo et al., 2011a).  
 
Nin-Pratt (2016) insists that only Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Malawi are 
countries where the “fertilizer technology” has a good chance of success. 
However, the present study establishes ongoing fertilizer-based productivity 
increase in 25 African countries, and an intensification of the production of key 
crops such as maize and rice. The World Bank statistics present two additional 
Agricultural inputs are becoming more easily available. 
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countries, Mauritius and Seychelles, using in 2014 already 285 and 363 kg/ha of 
fertilizer respectively. When Nin-Pratt (2016) speaks of fertilizer technology, he 
is referring to the former Asian Green Revolution, with its focus on cereals, while 
in many African regions other crops dominate the menu. But with urbanization, 
cereals become a key crop for ensuring food security (Akinyoade et al., 2014; 
FAO, 2006). Moreover, also for other crops fertilizer use technologies have been 
developed; IITA, for example, has been working since long on other Africa’s 
primary staple crops, such as banana and plantain, cassava, cowpea, soybean 
and yam. For crops like these, fertilizer technologies have been developed and 
their economics have been studied. For example, Nyombi (2014) studies 
banana, Fermont (2009) cassava, and Wairegi & van Asten (2013) compare 
banana, beans, cassava and coffee with maize and rice. 
 
4.5 Fertilizer as “silver bullet” 
 
A study of past but failed fertilizer promotion in Africa (Africa Region World Bank, 
2006) maintained that it was impossible to design “a universally applicable recipe 
for success”. The study in question nevertheless identified, on the basis of 
experiences, ten general guiding principles for public interventions. The present 
study also shows that differences between agro-ecological systems are not the 
main bottleneck for agricultural development; it is possible to develop fertilizer 
technologies for many of them. Therefore, instead of focusing on differences 
between African countries and regions, it appears to be more fruitful to focus on 
an element that many have in common and that makes Africa different from all 
other continents, except Oceania (see below): the average low NPP, and, 
through its effect on population density, high costs of transport, food and labor 
(subsection 3.4.3). 
 
This suggests that fertilizer use, applied in a context of ISFM, may be the “silver 
bullet” for African agricultural and rural development. In Africa, as everywhere 
else, food production increases directly proportional with fertilizer use (Fig. 2). 
But fertilizer consumption is very low in Africa, compared to the rest of the world 
(chapter 1). This is a good reason to suppose that food production and 
agricultural development will benefit from increasing fertilizer use. The World 
Bank (2007) underlines that low fertilizer use is one of the major constraints for 
increasing agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. As stressed by Giller 
et al. (2011), a consensus exists on the need to increase agricultural productivity 
to eradicate hunger and poverty, the first Millennium Development Goal. Ciceri 
& Allanore (2018) stress that fertilizers will play a pivotal role in achieving African 
food self-sufficiency, “given that ~90% of crop production growth is expected to 
come from higher yields and increased cropping intensity...” The first step in 
collaboratively working towards this common goal, the Africa fertilizer summit in 
Abuja in 2006, badly needs a follow-up. While the African heads of state declared 
that borders had to be eliminated for fertilizers, as had been decided for 
medicines before, a lot has still to be done to implement the proposed African 
Green Revolution (Eilittä, 2006). 
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The rate of adoption of fertilizer as a 
component for soil improvement, allowing 
the intensification of rainfed agriculture, 
has been very low in most African 
countries. African agriculture has been 
vastly underused as a resource for 
development (World Bank, 2007). This 
made it difficult to find a solution to the 
problems of food scarcity, social instability, 
and the growing numbers of migrants and 
refugees. The approach has a chance to 
succeed today where it failed in the past, 
because the availability of arable land per 
capita has become so low that increasing the productivity of land has become 
imperative (Fig. 5; Krautkraemer, 1994). Past failures have as a common 
element the belief that after the end of colonization, in the early sixties of the last 
century, Africa and (South East) Asia had an equal start. However, Asian 
countries adopted Green Revolution technologies, while African countries did not 
(e.g. Djurfeldt, 2005; Kuyvenhoven, 2008; Rakotoarisoa et al, 2011; Vlasblom, 
2013). In fact, a key difference existed and still exists: African natural resources 
are less abundant and less productive (section 3.2). 
 
     Phosphate mining. 
 
Fertilizer as the silver bullet. 
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4.6 Peculiarities of the African “Green Revolution” 
 
Nevertheless, Africa should draw lessons from the Asian Green Revolution. A 
key lesson is that “the political reality of the 1960s forced Asian elites to take the 
interests of peasant farmers seriously”; “the development plans for rural areas 
served to neutralize the appeal of political radicalism” (Vlasblom, 2013). The food 
insecurity and poverty of class 4, 5a and 6 countries is such, that uprisings are 
easily to organize. Investing in fertilizer means increasing the chances of peace 
in these countries. It is a mistake to assume that peace is a precondition for 
agricultural development. Improving rural income through higher agricultural 
productivity will be often the best way to prevent unrest and rebellion, as stressed 
by Akinwumi Adesina, president of the African Development Bank at the 28th 
summit of the African Union (Addis Ababa, 2017).  
 
Vlasblom (2013) notes that after independence, the elites in many Asian 
countries focused on agricultural development, while African governments 
equated development with rapid industrialization, and saw agriculture as 
backward. The World Bank (2007) concludes “that GDP growth originating in 
agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth 
originating outside agriculture”. This is so, because the former leads to lower 
costs of food and labor; and low food and labor costs, together with low costs of 
transport preconditions for developing competitive industries (ACET, 2017). 
Therefore, it is not astonishing that, in many cases, the effects of investing in 
industrialization have been disappointing, sometimes even where opportunities 
were promising (e.g. in DR Congo). CO2 emission, which can be taken as an 
indicator for industrialization, is low in most of Africa. It is well correlated with 
economic development, represented by the GNI/cap., and inversely correlated 
with the agricultural added value as percentage of the GDP (see Figure 6). With 
the African NPP being significantly lower than the Asian, the question is how the 
availability of food can be increased in such a way that the food prices and 
therefore the salaries go down, and peasant agriculture can turn into market-
oriented agriculture. What can be done to improve the competitiveness of African 
agriculture, which has been hampered by the low NPP and by the high transport, 
food and labor costs due to the low population density (Breman & Debrah, 2003; 
Pardey, 2014)?  
 
As shown in chapter 3, today, with the population density increasing, market-
oriented agriculture is developing in many African regions under the pressure of 
urbanization (see also World Bank, 2007; Dietz et al., 2012; Akinyoade et al., 
2014). However, urbanization is not automatically a strong engine for agricultural 
development. It is not, when urbanization is provoked by poverty instead of 
industrialization. Extreme examples are Liberia, Guinea Bissau, DR Congo, and 
Gambia, having a degree of urbanization above 40%, negligible CO2 emission 
and a very low FSI (annex Table II). Cheap low-quality2 imported food attracts a 
lot of people, and urban demand for food doesn’t translate into functioning 
                                                 
2 DR Congo is importing huge quantities of edible offal. 
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markets, due to the lack of buying power. A key particularity of the African Green 
Revolution is that it occurs in an era with liberalized global markets; this is a 
constraining factor as well. 
 
Another lesson to be learned from Asian agricultural development is accentuated 
by Byamugisha (2016), who points to the cases of two communist countries, 
China and Vietnam. China initially made the same mistake as the African 
countries did, that is, to focus on industrialization. Both countries realized that it 
is necessary to secure land tenure to support long-term investments in 
agricultural productivity, and to create vibrant land markets that can shift land 
and labor resources from less to more productive entities. Thanks to land 
reforms, which led to an increase in investments, agricultural productivity and 
incomes rose, and agriculture fueled the rest of the economy. This shows that 
following the agriculture-for-development agenda pays off (World Bank, 2007). 
In many African countries, land-use security is still a knotty problem (subsection 
3.4.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 A step-by-step approach 
 
The foregoing digression shows that focusing on fertilizer adoption as the first 
step for accelerating African agricultural development is not a simple matter. 
Nevertheless, in order to eliminate obstacles to development, one should start 
with the most important one. This means starting with soil fertility improvement 
and maintenance, with a view to closing the yield gap in rainfed agriculture, and 
The fertilized maize is easily recognized, 
both from a distance and from up close. 
For sustainable effects, fertilizer use in 
the context of ISFM (integrated soil 
fertility management) is a conditio sine 
qua non. 
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doing it in a context of ISFM to make it sustainable (section 3.4; Palm et al., 
1997; Mando et al., 2005).  
 
Luckily, except in extreme environments (with shallow soils and rocks, or very 
little rainfall), there are no agro-ecological obstacles for fertilizer use in an ISFM 
context. As long as run-off and deep infiltration are controlled, 300 mm of rain 
per season3 suffices in most cases; which means that fertilizer can be used 
without too much risk in African climates with the highest potential 
evapotranspiration, as those of the Sahel (Breman, 1995). The minimum 
required rainfall can be even below 150 mm where the potential 
evapotranspiration is low, that is, in mountainous regions and in the 
Mediterranean climate zones of North and Southern Africa (Alberda et al., 1992; 
Breman, 2011). The economic risk of fertilizer use is the lowest when applied in 
a mixed farming system (subsection 3.4.8). 
 
The above is not a plea for starting the introduction of fertilizer everywhere. One 
should start where the opportunities are best, extending from there into sub-
optimal regions. It is pity that certain countries with good agro-ecological 
conditions, like Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon and both Congos (Buringh & van 
Heemst, 1977), choose not to profit from them; instead of using the opportunity 
to produce for the continent, they prefer to import food from beyond the continent. 
Within countries, and even locally, one should start on the best soils, which allow 
for the development of a competitive market-oriented production system. A 
serious mistake, often made by donor NGOs which are critical of fertilizer use, is 
to accept the use of fertilizer only on overexploited and depleted land. In fact, 
fertilizer use effectiveness and profitability increase with soil fertility. Fertilizer is, 
for example, very effective on Rwanda’s volcanic soils (Breman et al., 2011). 
And in the heart of Niger’s Sahel, fertilizer turned out to be much more effective 
on fields around the farm which are enriched by livestock droppings than on 
exhausted outfields (Fofana et al., 2008). 
 
Also, it is important to identify the crops and production systems that have the 
best chance of making fertilizer use remunerative and competitive. As concluded 
by Wairegi and van Asten (2013) when exploring the scope of fertilizer use in the 
East African region: “…there is a scope and need for fertilizer use in the East 
African region, but the choice of crop for intensification and decisions about the 
amount and type of fertilizer should depend on input/output prices, crop response 
and crop residue management”. Once the fertilizer market, as a component of 
the external input market, is well developed and farmers have become 
experienced users, other crops and systems can be made more productive 
through fertilizer use as well. Also, smallholder farmers will benefit in time from 
the accessibility of fertilizer due to its use by large farmers, as happened in South 
Africa and Zambia; and food crops for local consumption will benefit from the 
input market development and the experience resulting from the production of 
export crops. Economic and social heterogeneity can be turned to advantage; 
                                                 
3 Or 600 mm/year where a year has two growing seasons. 
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this holds true for the diversity within the smallholder population as well. The 
World Bank (2007) stresses that for effectively accelerating agricultural 
development, safety nets are required for very poor smallholder farmers and for 
poor and unfavorable regions. In order for agricultural development to trigger 
socio-economic development, land grabbing should be combated, in spite of the 
fact that fertilizer is more profitable on larger farms (Wilson et al., 2018).  
 
4.8 Key policies 
 
Agricultural and economic policies have to be developed that help create or 
improve the conditions for agricultural development and its acceleration. Table 4 
presents an overview which qualifies policies both in a positive and negative 
sense, derived from the present study (chapter 3). The qualification applies to 
“agriculture-based countries” as defined by the World Bank (2007). The 
“agriculture-for-development agenda” aims to transform these countries into 
“urbanized countries”. The first step is to turn them into “transforming countries”, 
and this requires specific policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The improvement of roads and transport 
allows for cheaper inputs and more 
competitive prices of agricultural products. 
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Possible public support and intervention can take different forms, “promotion” 
and “investments”. “Subsidizing” is one of the ways of promotion; it may be opted 
for when the available public means are insufficient for general overall support. 
Before making the choice, one should wonder if it can lead to sustainable 
change. Improving the conditions for efficient fertilizer use, for example, by 
investments in ISFM and/or soil and water conservation, may be more effective 
in the long term than relying on fertilizer subsidies (see also section 4.10). 
 
Table 4  Assessment of the influence of policies* on agricultural development and its 
                 acceleration. 
 
Policy: promotion of and investments in Influence* 
positive inhibitor** 
Fertilizer & ISFM +++  
Soil & water conservation + + 
Improved crop varieties & pesticides ++  
Irrigation  + 
Mechanization + + 
Input & product market plus value chain development +++  
Favorable cost-benefit ratio inputs +++  
Transport & trade +++  
Mixed farming  +++  
Organic farming  + 
Land-use security ++  
Gender index improvement ++  
Peace & social stability +++  
Industrialization + + 
* The more pluses, the greater the intensity of influence. 
** A plus sign indicates that capital would be more productive if used for other investments. 
 
 
The agenda needs to be focused on increasing agricultural productivity, and 
fertilizer use in an ISFM context is able to increase both land and labor 
productivity in a sustainable way. In order to achieve maximum effects and high 
favorable cost-benefit ratios, improved crop varieties and pesticides should be 
used (Liu et al., 2015; McArthur & McCord, 2017). Using the latter on their own 
can only temporarily increase productivity, as resource depletion may harm 
sustainability (subsection 3.4.7). It goes without saying that for farmers to adopt 
the use of all three external inputs, input market development is a conditio sine 
qua non. The same counts for access to product markets. Both are necessary 
for farmers to reach cost-benefit ratios that encourage them to adopt this 
approach in their search for productivity improvement. 
 
Possibly the most important components of effective input and product market 
development are road improvement and the improvement of transport logistics 
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in general (subsection 3.3.3). With increasing population density these will be 
easier to realize (subsection 3.4.3); as a consequence, using fertilizer and other 
external inputs will become financially feasible for more farmers.  
 
 
After the use of fertilizer and other inputs, mechanization may be the second-
best way to improve productivity in Africa. It will, however, have more effect on 
labor than on land productivity. This is one of the reasons why short-sighted 
policies to foster agricultural development, by distribution of tractors, for 
example, can easily become obstacles to development, as they entail an 
ineffective use of scarce funds. Strategies aiming to reinforce human strength 
while effectively using the available labor, such as introducing animal traction, 
two-wheel tractors, or improved threshing methods, have a greater chance of 
paying off (subsection 3.4.9). Proper mechanization that fits the needs of a 
country is a welcome complement to fertilizer use, and helps in bringing food 
prices and wages down, the condition for realizing agriculture for development 
in Africa (Pardey, 2014). African policy makers can profit from lessons learned 
in India, a typical “transforming country” (World Bank, 2007), in order to make 
rational choices regarding mechanization and labor use (Basu & Nandi, 2014). 
They should be warned not to support large-scale industrial agriculture at the 
expense of smallholder family farming, and not to create a redundancy of 
agricultural labor before “agriculture for development” has created alternative 
Integrated soil fertility management, the key to sustainable fertilizer use. 
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employment. Zambia’s case could serve as a warning example here, with its 
accent on large-scale industrial agriculture (see subsection 3.3.3). 
 
Two other policies presented in Table 4 distinguished by three plusses in the 
column of positive influence are starting fertilizer promotion where possible in 
mixed farming systems, and the promotion of peace and social stability. The 
justifications are presented in respectively subsections 3.4.8 and 3.3.3. Other 
essential components of an effective agricultural development policy are the 
improvement of land-use security and of the position of women – women farmers 
in particular –; this claim is substantiated in subsections 3.4.2 and 3.4.4. Finally, 
industrialization should not start prematurely, but should go hand in hand with 
agricultural development. For example, agro-industries linked to value chains 
which provide cheap food can help establish the competitive wages required by 
the factories in urban centers. 
 
Not discussed here, but mentioned by the World Bank (2007), are the factors of 
health and education. Zambia is mentioned as an example of a country where a 
high proportion of young men died of AIDS. The scarcity of labor could be a 
justification for its focus on large-scale industrial agriculture. Also, price and 
credit policies have not been discussed here. They have remained hidden, as 
factors influencing market development, and the cost-benefit ratios of inputs and 
trade. Finally, research and extension services have not been mentioned. Their 
importance is not denied; on the contrary, good fertilizer use recommendations 
are indispensable for effective and beneficial fertilizer use. But, too often, policy 
agendas favor cheap research and extension services, neglecting the conditions 
that have to be created in order to enable farmers to opt for higher productivity. 
The knowledge and attitudes of farmers are not the main bottlenecks for 
agricultural development. In some countries, however, Western NGOs 
convinced farmers that fertilizer would damage their soils. Uganda and 
Madagascar are the best known examples (see subsection 3.4.7 and section 
4.12). 
 
4.9 Fertilizer at the heart of a program 
 
As mentioned before, the outcomes of this study stress the need to correct first 
what was identified as the most limiting factor: the dominance of poor and infertile 
soils in Africa. This is why fertilizer, used in an ISFM context, is presented as the 
silver bullet for change. To become effective, its promotion has to be combined 
with at least five other policies (each marked by three pluses), and reinforced by 
the promotion of improved varieties and pesticides, the ensuring of land-use 
security, and the improvement of gender equality (Table 4). Promoting fertilizer 
use to counter the low productivity of soils, without paying attention to other yield 
limiting-factors, will in general be without effect (African Region World Bank, 
2006). In order for policies to become effective, policy makers, businessmen and 
-women, and farmers and their organizations need to collaborate. 
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The results of the Dutch-funded IFDC CATALIST project, which aimed to trigger 
agricultural transformation in Burundi, DR Congo and Rwanda (2006–2015), 
offer a preliminary indication that the package proposed above can work. Table 
5 compares fertilizer use and cereal yield, comparing the situation just before the 
start of the project with that at the end of our observation period. Prices, however, 
are those from the end of the first project phase (Breman et al., 2011). 
 
Table 5 The differentiated effects of triggering agricultural development in three 
neighboring African countries, comparing the main indicators for development 
used in this study. 
 
Indicator of agricultural 
development 
Burundi DR Congo* Rwanda 
2005 2014 2005 2014 2005 2014 
Fertilizer use (kg/ha) 3 11 0 3 3 13 
Average fertilizer price 
(US$/kg)** 
 0.9  1.2  0.7 
Average CBR (US$/US$)***  0.21  0,38  0.22 
Cereal yield (t/ha) 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.0 
* Only two provinces, North and South Kivu 
** Average of DAP (di-ammonium phosphate), KCl (potassium chloride), NPK & urea 
*** Average cost-benefit ratio (CBR)  for 3 cereals, maize, rice and wheat, plus beans and potatoes 
 
A comparison of the data from three countries in Table 5 is of particular interest, 
as all three have a shared history of colonization, while two of them, Burundi and 
Rwanda, have an almost similar population and agro-ecology. It was the 
government of Rwanda who invited the IFDC to support them, and during the 
entire project period, the government has been focused on agricultural 
development; the entire package was implemented. In DR Congo, the project 
has only been active in the two Kivu provinces, bordering on Burundi and 
Rwanda. Several efforts have been made, however, to get the central 
government in Kinshasa interested. Four of the policies listed in Table 4 were 
not developed or effective: input and product market development received no 
attention; inputs were smuggled into the country, or brought in by the project. 
The decision taken by the African heads of states in Abuja (African Union, 2007) 
to eliminate trade barriers for fertilizer had not been put into effect, road networks 
were in awful condition, and peace and stability were a far cry. Besides, land-
use security was (and is) badly lacking, and the countries belonged to the bottom 
ten on the ranking of countries in terms of the gender-equality. In Burundi, parts 
of the package were implemented; the country stood closer to Rwanda than to 
DR Congo. Rwanda supported fertilizer use through subsidies, as is shown in 
the price difference. 
  
All but one of the numbers in Table 5 reflect this reality; Rwanda shows clear 
agricultural development, DR Congo does not, and Burundi occupies an 
intermediary position. Only as far as the CBR value is concerned, Burundi does 
somewhat better than Rwanda. The difference is caused by one crop, potatoes; 
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the average farm-gate potato price in Burundi was higher than in Rwanda: 0.24 
versus 0.18 US$/kg. Eliminating potatoes from the 5 crops, or considering only 
the 3 cereals, gives an CBR for Burundi and Rwanda of respectively 0.29 and 
0.24. For farmers, fertilizer use was the most attractive in Rwanda, thanks to an 
effective agricultural policy. 
 
This policy effect on prices is more clear than in subsection 3.3.2. This illustrates 
the limited accuracy, mentioned in section 4.1. At the basis of the findings 
mentioned in 3.3.2 are single data obtained from individuals in the countries 
concerned (section 2.3); Table 5 is based on numerous observations over a 
longer period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISFM not only requires organic soil amendments; lime is also an important input. It is produced on 
a small scale, mostly, however, for construction purposes. 
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4.10 Subsidies and competition 
 
One may wonder why fertilizer subsidies are required in Burundi and Rwanda, 
in view of the fact that their NPP is far above the African average, thanks to fertile 
volcanic soils and favorable rainfall, and that they have a very high population 
density. However, the countries are surrounded by large regions with a low NPP 
and are separated from import harbors by more than a thousand kilometers of 
low-quality roads, making external inputs expensive.  
 
The package as presented in Table 4 is effective, but ways have to be found to 
make the effects sustainable. Subsidies for fertilizer are controversial. Carr 
(2017) and Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2014) observed in Malawi, a country very similar 
to Burundi and Rwanda, that the fraction of vulnerable people in the population 
is inversely correlated with the amount of subsidized fertilizer per capita. This is 
why King and Wang (2015) argue for fertilizer aid. However, this aid would take 
a big chunk out of the national budget, and the funds could not be used for 
realizing other required structural changes (Huang et al., 2017). Balu et al. (2011) 
underlined that “in an environment riddled with inefficiencies that contribute to 
the high costs of using fertilizers, the introduction of subsidies only adds more 
fiscal burden”. The entire value chain of agricultural inputs has to be improved. 
Lack of access to cheap credit is, for example, another factor inhibiting fertilizer 
use (van Manen, 2018). 
 
Huang et al. (2017) view the Rwandan fertilizer subsidy in a (relatively) positive 
light; they see it as one of the components of a more holistic “crop intensification 
program”. They point out that it used up only an average of about 1% of the 
national budget. Among the nine countries studied, five Asian and four African, 
Rwanda spent the lowest percentage of the national budget on fertilizer 
subsidies and showed the highest cereal yield growth for the 2000–2013 period: 
4.6%. In fact, for the nine countries no correlation was found between the funds 
used, in terms of the percentage of the national budget, and the cereal yield 
growth observed. For the three other African countries these pairs of numbers 
are: Malawi 17.0% of the budget and 4.4% yield growth; Nigeria 1.7% and 3.6%; 
and Tanzania 1.1 and 0.6%. Malawi and Rwanda are class 2, and Nigeria and 
Tanzania class 4 countries (see Table I in the annex). 
 
Huang et al. (2017) mention that Rwanda stopped its effective fertilizer subsidy 
program in 2014. In the meantime, Burundi started a so called voucher program, 
subsidizing fertilizer for a target group of 300,000 farmers. While in 2012 the 
average cereal yields in Burundi and Rwanda were 1.1 and 2.1 t/ha, after 2014 
the Burundian yield started increasing and the Rwandan yield dropped. Both 
countries had the same yield in 2016: 1.5 t/ha.  
 
Huang et al. (2017) recommend that the Asian countries, typical “transforming 
countries” in the language of World Bank’s Development Report (2007), stop the 
subsidies. They point to huge public costs, but also see subsidies as a hindrance 
for private-sector input-market development and as leading to inefficiency in 
 67 
fertilizer use. But in African countries, typical “agriculture-based countries” 
(World Bank, 2007), where fertilizer use is in its early stages and where soil 
fertility is being impaired, “fertilizer subsidies will continue to be an inescapable 
feature of agricultural policy”. An argument for offering support to farmers using 
fertilizer during the introductory stage is that the use efficiency of fertilizer is low 
if applications are imbalanced or wrong, especially on poor and/or exhausted 
soils providing very limited risk-reducing buffers (Njoroge et al., 2019). Further, 
soil nutrient pools are often exhausted, resulting in a low recovery of P and K, as 
large amounts of applied nutrients will remain in slowly-releasing pools for many 
years (Wolf and Janssen, 1989). While experienced farmers after years of 
regular fertilizer use and soil improvement are able to produce on average 25 kg 
of extra cereal grain per kg of fertilizer-N, at the start even experienced farmers 
will not produce much more than half of it on poor soils. This is often due to the 
strong local variability of soil fertility, an imbalanced supply of nutrients, poor 
plant emergence and seed set, and strong competition between the crop and 
soil organisms for both the nutrients already present and for the fertilizer 
nutrients. In time, thanks to fertilizer use and effective soil fertility management 
(ISFM), the soil organic matter will become enriched with fertilizer nutrients which 
will satiate the soil organisms (Mando et al., 2005a; Wopereis et al., 2008). 
 
This low initial fertilizer use efficiency on poor soils, combined with high fertilizer 
costs, makes it difficult for African farmers to compete with producers from all 
over the world who benefit from better soils and decades of fertilizer use 
experience. The global trade liberalization has forced them to compete. One 
should realize that in a country like Rwanda, the production costs per kilo of 
product are still significantly higher for the dominant low-external-input 
agriculture than for farmers who recently adopted the use of fertilizers (e.g. 
Habimana, 2008). Not using fertilizer is no option. This is why it is tempting for 
African governments to opt for the quick fix by importing (or allowing the 
importation of) cheap food from abroad, rather than to provide a long-term 
solution by investing in national food self-sufficiency and helping farmers to live 
through the period with low initial fertilizer use efficiency.  
 
Koning (2017) notes that agricultural trade agreements with African countries 
often benefit the partners more than Africa. One should consider protecting 
farmers at least during the phase of the introduction of fertilizers and other 
external inputs. Protective measures are needed most in countries and regions 
with a low NPP. Few African countries have a NPP above 1.0 t/ha (see tables 1 
and 2). Asia as a whole and South East Asia have an average NPP of 
respectively 1.1 and 1.6 t/ha (derived from Buringh & van Heemst, 1977). 
 
 
4.11 Mechanization; labor productivity versus land productivity 
 
This provokes the question if productivity increase through fertilizer use ought to 
be considered at all. Taking stock of the costs of production in counties or regions 
with extremely low NPP values, should one not say that there is no prospect for 
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them to be competitive on an open, liberalized market? Again the comparison 
with another continent is of interest; this time not Asia, but Oceania. Oceania has 
an even lower average NPP than Africa, about 520 kg/ha against the African 630 
kg/ha (Buringh & van Heemst, 1977). If we look closer, Oceania turns out to be 
heterogeneous; the islands have an NPP far above the average, Australia’s is 
somewhat lower. 
 
We can find a preliminary answer to our question by comparing Africa with 
Australia and New Zealand, with an average NPP of about 500, and 1,400 kg/ha. 
In Africa, until recently, production increase was mainly achieved through area 
expansion; the productivity of land and labor barely increased. From 1961 to 
2009, the land productivity increased from 45 to 75 US$/ha, and labor 
productivity from 430 to 550 US$/cap. In Oceania as a whole, the labor 
productivity increased from 20,000 to 45,000 US$/cap. This is mainly due to 
developments in Australia and New Zealand, which are typical urbanized 
countries (World Bank, 2007), with only 2.6 and 6.2 percent of the population 
active in agriculture, against 57% in Africa. Australia has 1.93 ha/cap. of arable 
land, Africa 0.25, and New Zealand 0.13. Per capita employed in agriculture 
these numbers are respectively 74, 0.44 and 2.1 ha/cap. Australia is an empty 
country compared to Africa. New Zealand is more densely populated than Africa, 
having only half the area of arable land per capita (0.13 versus 0.25 ha). New 
Zealand’s farmers are investing heavily in the productivity of their land, using 
    The hoe still plays an important role in African agriculture. 
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1,490 kg/ha of fertilizer. Australian farmers are using only 54 kg/ha of fertilizer; 
they gave invested much more in increasing labor productivity by mechanization. 
Poor soil fertility combined with high drought risks are forcing farmers to be 
cautious with respect to the use of expensive inputs; they only apply them when 
they expect financial returns. The use of fertilizer has gone down in recent years, 
in response to increased climate variability (www.yieldgap.org). It is possible that 
Diao et al. (2016) are right when they state that mechanization – or an increase 
of labor productivity – will have to be part of the approach for transforming African 
agriculture. In subsection 3.4.9, animal traction was mentioned as an option to 
be considered. Aune et al. (2017) also mention it as a way to realize a more 
efficient input use and a higher land and labor productivity. 
 
A factor hindering mechanization in Africa, apart from the very limited availability 
of land and its low productivity, is the limited availability of capital and credit for 
rural operators (subsection 3.4.9). This not only affects farmers, it also blocks 
the development of small- and medium-size enterprises in the entire value chain 
(van Manen et al., 2018). The unequal access to capital partly explains why it 
appears to be easier for larger farms to increase agricultural productivity (Wilson 
et al., 2018). Instead of waiting for public and private action plans, farmers should 
start organizing themselves and creating economies of scale by collaboration 
(World Bank, 2007). This has been the approach adopted by Dutch farmers one 
century ago, and it has been effectively used in the Chinese context as well. One 
may wonder if John Deer’s very recent initiative in Nigeria will also prove 
effective. “Hello Tractor enables farmers to request affordable tractor services, 
while providing enhanced security to tractor owners through remote asset 
tracking and virtual monitoring. This value also extends to banks financing tractors 
and dealers who service them” (https://www.hellotractor.com/home). 
 
 
A question remains to be answered. Why have low NPP and low population 
density been a hindrance for agricultural development in Africa, while they did 
not hinder Australian agricultural development? The answer is that the latter, 
starting at the end of the eighteenth century, was fostered by a strong and 
  Mechanization may pay off. 
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increasing demand for primary products from Great Britain, the occupier of the 
continent, and that the cheap labor of prisoners was used for crop production 
(Clarkson, 1971).  
 
There is a parallel with agricultural development South Africa, which also has a 
low average NPP (see Table 2); the connections with the Dutch and English 
colonizers account for the anomalous growth. During the First World War, 
agricultural production in South Africa received a strong boost. The war had 
reduced the role of competition, as agricultural production in Europe was 
severely disrupted during the war years 
 (https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/impact-war-agriculture-and-land).  
The second African exception, Egypt, started developing agriculture before 
hardly any other country had thought about it. 
 
4.12 Environmental risks 
 
When promoting fertilizer use in Africa, its environmental risks need to be 
recognized. They have to be taken into account by farmers, business people, 
governments and the general population. Liu et al. (2015) claim that overuse and 
other improper uses of fertilizer and pesticides are threatening the world’s cereal 
production. But at the same time, they insist that most African countries, in 
particular those with low per-capita food supplies, need to continue to increase 
their use of agro-chemicals in order to feed their growing populations. Bindraban 
et al. (2015) share the view that fertilizer use comes with an environmental cost, 
and has so far not been effective in lifting African farmers out of poverty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main causes of African land degradation are 
the cutting of trees and the overexploitation of 
natural resources by extensive agriculture. 
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Countries should not simply avoid fertilizers for environmental reasons, since soil 
degradation as a result of fertilizer omission can pose much greater risks for 
agricultural production (Palm et al., 2004). Soil degradation, caused by 
overexploitation and exhaustion, is the main cause of desertification in Africa. In 
an absolute sense, Africa may not yet be heavily populated, but in view of the 
low NPP, overpopulation is already a significant factor on the continent. 
Therefore, fertilizer use can be a crucial tool for desertification control; it can 
trigger intensification in regions with relatively favorable agro-ecological and/or 
market conditions (Breman, 2002). By doing so, it leaves more land available for 
nature. Fertilizer can also contribute to the maintenance of biodiversity, as 
illustrated by the fact that the elephant density is higher in Africa where more 
fertilizer is being used on cropland (Smaling et al., 2006). 
 
Promoting “agro-ecology” as the solution for African’s food insecurity (Schutter, 
O. de, 2010) entails a more serious environmental risk than the use of fertilizers, 
for the proponents of this solution ignore the fact that overexploitation by 
overpopulation is main cause of land degradation and the loss of biodiversity. 
Organic farming is not a viable alternative to fertilizer use (subsection 3.4.7). It 
adds on average about 1 t/ha of cereals to the low African yields. But the farmers 
whose results are summarized in Table 5 doubled or tripled their yields within 
two to four years after starting to use fertilizers in an ISFM context (Breman, 
2013). A minor yield reduction of about 20% is assumed when organic farming 
is compared to conventional farming (Tittonell., 2014). Three meta-analyses of 
organic yield gaps (De Ponti et al., 2012; Seufert et al., 2012; Ponisio et al., 2015) 
rather consistently conclude that the average yield gap varies between 19 and 
25 percent. Yet, if these yield differences are adjusted by including the area 
needed to grow legume crops supplying the required N input into the system, 
they are typically more than doubled, especially when animals are used to 
capture N from legume-grass mixtures. There are more examples of improper 
analyses overestimating the potential of organic farming (e.g. Muller et la., 2017; 
Van der Ven et al.,2018). 
 
This does not imply that the known risks of agro-chemicals should not be taken 
seriously, or that components of organic farming should not be considered in the 
search for technologies and approaches for decreasing these risks, and for the 
identification of alternatives. The World Bank (2007) suggests the exploitation of 
biological and ecological processes for input-use decrease. A lot of attention has 
been devoted to the question whether the potential of leguminous species to 
fixate biological nitrogen should be utilized before turning to fertilizer nitrogen 
(e.g. Giller et al., 1997; Bationo et al., 2011b; Breman & van Reuler, 2003). Also, 
attention could be given to, for example, the potential of mycorrhiza to replace 
P-fertilizer, and to developing approaches which can help to slow down the 
replacement of beneficial slow-growing soil micro-organisms by fast-growing 
ones feeding on fertilizer (Malý et al., 2009). One possible form of follow-up 
research could aim at identifying better fertilizer and fertilizer use approaches 
(Bindraban et al., 2015; Breman, 2015; Ciceri & Allanore, 2018).  
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In the eyes of many, Africa is still “empty”. The basic mistake behind the belief 
that organic farming can play a key role in solving Africa’s food insecurity 
problem in a more sustainable way, is the neglect of the low NPP. Africa is 
overpopulated at a low absolute population density! Many do not realize that, 
apart from the rapidly shrinking forests, there is land not used for cropping that 
is nevertheless crucial for cropping. If no fertilizers are used, land has to lay 
fallow, or grazing land with livestock is required, for maintaining soil fertility. In 
general it is estimated that that every year of cropping requires four years of 
fallow for sustainable land use in Africa; this means that 80% of the arable land 
should lay fallow. Due to population pressure, most of the fallow land in Africa 
has disappeared. Heady & Jayne (2014), referring to Kenya, Malawi and Nigeria, 
present average numbers of respectively 25, 15 and 25 percent. But even this 
land is not “resting”, it is intensively used for grazing. “Empty” land in Africa is 
rangeland, and the value of the livestock is higher than that of agricultural stocks. 
For the Western African countries of Table 1, the value of livestock is 63% 
against 37% for the agricultural stock; for the Southern African countries of Table 
2 the numbers are respectively 75% and 25%. 
 
The livestock is badly needed for the maintenance of crop yields on land where 
no fertilizer is applied. Rufino et al. (2011) found that in Zimbabwe 4–10 ha of 
rangeland for livestock is required to produce the required manure for 
maintaining crop production on 1 ha of arable land. In Western Africa, less than 
4 hectares of rangeland exist for each hectare of cropland. If the countries 
bordering the Sahara desert are left out of consideration, only 1.2 ha of 
rangeland is available per hectare of cropland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
stop climate change by the production of biofuel. 
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For Southern Africa, the numbers seem to be more favorable, but this is mainly 
due to the fact that parts of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are occupied 
by deserts. Desert borders cannot be used for crop production, but they offer 
good opportunities for raising livestock (Breman & de Wit, 1982). Without this 
“advantage” of deserts, also in Southern Africa the availability of rangeland is 
insufficient for maintaining the low present crop yields using manure. In 
Zimbabwe, for example, 4–10 ha per hectare of cropland are required, with only 
2.8 ha of rangeland being available (Rufino et al., 2011). And one has to realize 
that not only in the Western and Southern African countries with deserts, but also 
elsewhere most of the livestock is grazing most of the time far away from 
cropland, which means that most of the manure will never be accessible for crop 
farmers.  
 
 
 
 
In spite of all this, governments and individuals, inside and outside Africa, justify 
land grabbing, invoking the belief that Africa is “empty”. Land is acquired by 
outside private investors, companies, governments, and national elites, and it is 
used for commodity crops, including agrofuels, which are then sold on the 
overseas market (Kasimbazi, 2017).  
 
      In Africa, the number of elephants rises strongly when more fertilizer is being applied 
      on cropland. 
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To sum up, population density in most of Africa exceeds the natural carrying 
capacity of the land. The consequences are strong nutrient mining and declining 
soil fertility (Henao & Baanante, 2006). Improved productivity is badly needed to 
feed the growing population and to curtail the expansion of agricultural land-use. 
Expansion will entail the loss of biodiversity. The natural environment is seriously 
threatened, threatening in turn the socio-economic environment, in particular in 
those countries where agriculture dominates the GDP. Better crop nutrition will 
be needed to maintain and improve crop yields on existing farmlands. Balanced 
fertilizer use can make a difference, while integrated soil fertility management 
(ISFM) is needed to prevent overdosing and inefficient use. Besides fertilizer to 
nourish the crop, soil amendments4 are required to improve and to maintain soil 
fertility (e.g. Palm et al., 1997; Breman et al., 2011). Without them, the soil will in 
due time become too acid, and the organic matter stocks will become too low to 
ensure sufficient nutrient and water storage (Bationo et al., 2012; Mando et al., 
2005b). The neglect of these facts largely explains why the promotion of the 
Green Revolution failed in Africa (Pieri, 1989). 
                                                 
4 Organic matter and lime in particular.  
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
A hopeful tendency has been identified: African agricultural development is 
taking off. Whereas very few African countries started their Green Revolution 
already in the 1960s, many others are following suit in the last two decades: their 
cereal yields are increasing, and in almost all cases this seems due to the 
adoption and increase of fertilizer use. 
  
About one quarter of the African population lives in countries where cereal yields 
have not increased since the early sixties of the last century, or where they have 
increased only very slowly, owing to a more intensive use of local agricultural 
inputs. In order to prevent food insecurity in Africa, now and in the future, 
agricultural development is essential. In view of the importance of agriculture for 
the economies of many countries, and the concomitant food insecurity, 
agricultural development needs to become agriculture for socio-economic 
development. Efforts should focus on the rapid improvement of the productivity 
of land and labor, with land productivity coming first. 
 
By classifying countries in six classes, characterized by the average annual rate 
of growth of the national cereal yield, from negative to positive at the highest 
known rate, policies and conditions favoring or hindering agricultural 
development have been identified. Agro-ecological conditions or technical 
aspects seem not to constitute major hindrances for agricultural development; 
the most serious obstacle are of a socio-economic nature. Meanwhile, the low 
soil nutrient status is evidently a major cause of low crop yields and low livestock 
productivity in most of Africa; therefore, the adoption of fertilizer use is to be 
considered as a precondition for change and development. 
 
In order to be effective, fertilizer use promotion will have to be the central part of 
an agricultural development program requiring the collaboration of farmers, 
businesspeople and governments. Problems have to be tackled one by one, 
starting with the most serious ones. Intensification of rainfed agriculture has been 
identified as the way to go. To ensure an optimal effect of fertilizer, its use has 
to be combined with good agronomic practices, including demonstrations, the 
training of farmers, the use of improved crop varieties, proper crop rotations, and 
the use of biocides where biological solutions are not available. In order to 
ensure sustainability, this package needs to be deployed in the context of 
integrated soil fertility management. The required investments have the best 
chance to be made if land-use security is assured; and the effective adoption of 
the technologies depends in part on efforts to reduce gender inequality. Small-
scale mechanization may have to be included in the package required to trigger 
agriculture for development.  
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Throughout the years Henk Breman and his colleagues have sought to combine in 
depth agricultural research with operational policy advice. As a policy maker I was 
impressed by their creativity and thorough knowledge of conditions in the field. In this 
book they bring together promising results of research and experience in a large group 
of countries. In a period of accelerated climate change, erratic rainfall, decreasing soil 
fertility and high population pressure an integrated approach to agricultural 
development, food security and poverty reduction, as recommended in this book, is 
crucial. 
 
Jan Pronk 
 
 
Nowhere in the World is the SDG agenda more relevant and urgent than in Africa. 
The present analysis is an important contribution to the debate on the future of Africa 
– and to achieving SDG2. I strongly commend this report to you and encourage you 
to delve deeper than just the abstract. Read on! 
 
Ken Giller 
 
 
The book is a tool for policy makers and their advisers, both in and beyond Africa, 
interested in furthering socio-economic development by investing in agriculture 
development. It provides a comparative analysis of agricultural development and 
agricultural policies in almost all African countries since 1960, and identifies socio-
economic and agro-ecological determinants for success or failure. The authors claim 
that fertilizer use is the silver bullet in the quest for greater food security, welfare and 
economic development on the continent.  
 
The book presents reasons for optimism. Agricultural development is taking off; in 
quite a few countries the increase in food production outstrips the population growth. 
However, in other countries food security is not or not sufficiently improving. Still one 
quarter of the African population is living in countries where crop yields have remained 
the same, or even have decreased, since the 1960s. This emphasizes the need to 
develop and support effective policies which can help accelerate agricultural 
development. Promoting sustainable fertilizer use should be a first step. The analysis 
is interspersed with examples and photographs from a wide range of countries. 
Almost thirty countries have been visited by at least one of the authors. 
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